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BASIS PROVISIONS FOR STOCK DIVIDENDS
UNDER THE 1939 REVENUE ACT
By ELLSWORTH C. ALVORDt and HERMAN C. BIEGELt
PRIOR to 1936, administrative regulations had long provided that, in
the case of a stock dividend, the original stock's basis was to be allocated
between that stock and the dividend stock for purposes of determining
gain or loss on the subsequent disposition of either. The Koshland case
invalidated these regulations.1 It held that the original stock's basis could
not be reduced by any amount attributable to the dividend stock. The
Gowran case then held that the dividend stock had a "zero" basis.
2
At once considerable confusion resulted. Taxpayers and the Treasury
had, over a long period, acted in reliance on these administrative pro-
visions. Now each would be adversely affected tax-wise: the taxpayer,
where he had disposed of the original stock and still retained the dividend
stock; the Treasury, in the converse situation. Ioreover, serious legal
questions arose as to whether the effect of those decisions might be
narrowed by statutory provisions not considered in those cases.' Strained
constructions were thus offered as to other sections of the Revenue Act.
Doubts arose as to the contemplated scope of statutory provisions con-
ceived in the first instance for an entirely different purpose.
As a result, Congress at the last session took up the task of clarifying
the basis provisions for stock dividends. The problems presented were
not simple. It was necessary in the first instance to decide on a proper
rule of general application for the future. Congress could choose one
of three possible rules: (1) allocate the old stock's basis between it and
the dividend stock; or (2) give the dividend stock a "zero" basis; or
(3) reduce the old stock's basis by the fair market value of the dividend
stock.
t1,fember of New York, District of Columbia and United States Supreme Court Bars.
$f~ember of New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936).
2. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937).
3. The Koshland and Gouran cases related to the Revenue Act of 1928. It .%as
thought that § 113(b) (1) (D) of the 1932 and subsequent Revenue Acts, requiring an
adjustment to basis by reason of tax-free distributions, might offer the solution. ISee
discussion ifra p. 850 et seq.]. § 115(d) of the 1928 and subsequent Acts also re-
quired a reduction of basis by reason of capital distributions. It -was possible that, if
properly presented in litigation, stock dividends might be regarded within this category.
Finally, there was the possibility of arguing that some stock dividend transactions con-
stituted recapitalizations, and therefore statutory reorganizations. ,.EvE::vF AcTs or
1928 and 1932, § 112(i) (1) (C) ; R-VE xE Acrs or 1934, 1936 and 1938, § 112(g) (1) (C).
The express statutory provisions for an allocation of basis in those cases would then ba
applicable. REvza TE Acrs oF 1928, 1932, 1934, 1936 and 1938, § 113(a) (6).
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It was also necessary to validate those transactions consummated in
the past in reliance upon the then applicable regulations. This could be
accomplished merely by ratifying prior Treasury regulations. But fair-
ness required a series of exceptions in the retroactive application of this
rule. Cases had been settled or disposed of either by court decisions or
closing agreement on some basis other than those regulations. These
should not now be reopened. Finally, it was necessary to integrate the
new provisions with the old. It would have to be made clear that existing
provisions of possible application 4 yielded in favor of the statutory scheme
expressly adopted for the stock dividend basis problem.
The Revenue Act of 1939 attempted the solution to these problems.
But it required three pages of detailed, technical, complicated statutory
provisions. To determine how well this attempt succeeded is the pur-
pose of this Article. In making this evaluation, however, it is neces-
sary: first to present, by way of background, the problems which the
highly articulated statute was designed to solve; second, to explain the
complex provisions adopted as the solution to these problems; and
third, to consider the possible omissions in, and the new problems created
by, the solution.
I. BACKGROUND
The history of the taxable status of stock dividends under the federal
income tax statutes reveals a progressive endeavor on the part of Congress
to keep pace with the Supreme Court's ever-changing concept of income.
At first, the Revenue Acts were silent with respect to the taxability
of stock dividends. Hence the Treasury attempted to tax them under
the provisions of the act taxing corporate dividends in general.' But
the Supreme Court held that a stock dividend of common stock paid
to common stockholders was not income within the meaning of the Act.'
It indicated, however, that there might be a difference in the scope of
the term "income" as defined in the statute and as used in the Consti-
tution." Congress then specifically provided that a "stock dividend shall
be considered income, to the amount of its cash value." The Supreme
Court promptly held that a dividend paid in common stock to a common
stockholder was not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amend-
4. As, e.g., INT. REV. CODE § 113(b) (1) (D) and § 115(d) (1939).
5. REVENUE ACT OF 1913, § II B.
6. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 (1918).
7. Id. at 425. Mr. Justice Holmes in the decision of the Court stated: "But it is
not necessarily true that income means the same thing in the Constitution and the aet,"
See also dissent of Holmes, J., in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 219 (1920).
8. REVENUE ACT OF 1916, § 2(a). The Revenue Act of 1918 also provided for a
tax on dividends and defined a dividend as any corporate distribution "whether in cash
or in other property or in stock of the corporation." REVENUE ACT OF 1918, §§213 and
201 (a).
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mentf Although Eisner v. Macomber involved only the taxation of a
dividend declared in common stock to a common stockholder, the Treasury
gave the decision a broader interpretation. It ruled that where a cor-
poration transfers a part of its surplus to capital account and issues new
stock therefor to its stockholders, such stock is not income to them."
No distinction was made as to the type of stock so issued -whether
preferred on common, common on preferred, preferred on preferred,
or otherwise.1 To complement this provision, the Treasury also indi-
cated the method of determining the basis of the original and dividend
stocks for purposes of computing gain or loss on the sale thereof: where
the dividend stock was of a different character or preference, the cost
of the original stock was to be allocated over both classes of stock in
accordance with the respective value of each class of stock at the time
the dividend was issued.'
2
Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1921, attempted to follow Eisner v.
Macomber, and provided that: "A stock dividend shall not be subject
to tax . . .,,*3 The Treasury construed this provision broadly: "Stock
issued by a corporation as a dividend does not constitute taxable income
to a stockholder in such corporation ..... ."I'
Soon after the passage of the 1921 Act, the Supreme Court, in a
series of cases involving corporate reorganizations, pointed out the dis-
tinction between a stock dividend which worked no change in the cor-
porate entity, the same interest in the same corporation being represented
after the distribution by more shares of precisely the same character,
and a dividend where there had been a change of corporate identity or
a change in the nature of the shares issued as a dividend so that the
proportional interest of the stockholder after the distribution was es-
sentially different from his former interest." Nevertheless the Treasury's
9. Eisner v. Maceomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920). For contemporary comments criti-
cising the decision, see Seligman, Implications and Effects of the Sto: Dhidend Deci-
sion (1921) 21 COL L. REV. 313; Warren, Taxability of Stoch Dizidends as Income
(1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 885. See also Clark, Eisner v. Macomber and Some Income
Tax Problems (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 735.
10. T. D. 3052, 3 Cur. Bun. 38 (1920).
11. See 0. D. 801, 4 Cum. BLTL- 24 (1921), where it was stated that: "A stocz:
dividend paid in true preferred stock is exempt from tax the same as though the divi-
dend were paid in common stock; . . ."
12. T. D. 3059, 3 Cux. BuLL. 38 (1920).
13. REVENUE ACT OF 1921, § 201(d). The Congressional committee stated that this
provision "modifies the definition of dividends in existing law, by exempting stock divi-
dends from the income tax, as required by the decision of the Supreme Court in Eisrer
v. Macomber. . ." H. R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) 8; SE:T. REP. No.
275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) 9.
14. U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art 1548.
15. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (1921); Rockefeller v. United States,
257 U. S. 176 (1921) ; Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134 (1923) ; Marr v. United States,
268 U. S. 536 (1925).
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construction of the statute remained unaltered.'0 Correlatively, the De-
partment maintained during this period that if the dividend stock was
of a character or preference materially different from the original stock,
the cost of the latter should be apportioned between both stocks in
accordance with their respective fair market values at the date of issu-
ance of the stock dividend.' 7
The problem seemed settled. And it was - for almost fifteen years.
There was, of course, the difficulty of distinguishing between a true stock
dividend and a cash distribution,'" i.e., whether a transaction constituted
a distribution of cash with an option to apply the dividend to the pur-
chase of stock;19 or, whether there was a prearrangement among the
stockholders to apply the cash for the stock.20 But stock dividends, as
such, were regarded as non-taxable.
Then, after fifteen years of apparent certainty in the taxation of stock
dividends, the Supreme Court specifically held that a dividend in common
stock to preferred stockholders constituted taxable income under the
Constitution.2' The Court did not decide at that time whether Congress,
in the successive Revenue Acts since 1921, had intended to tax such
dividends when received. The decision did hold, however, that on the
sale of the original stock (in the Koshland case, preferred stock) the
Treasury Department was without power to prescribe by regulation that
an adjustment to the cost of that stock was warranted by reason of the
common stock received as a dividend.2
16. U. S. Treas. Reg. 65 and 69, Art. 1548; U. S. Treas. Reg. 74 and 77, Art. 628;
U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 115-8.
17. U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 1548; U. S. Treas. Reg. 65 and 69, Art. 1599; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 74 and 77, Art. 600; U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 113(a) (12)-1.
18. See MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 41-45.
19. In such event, the dividend was held taxable. See Appeal of Langenback, 2
B.T.A. 777 (1925). Cf. Lonsdale v. Comm'r, 32 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929), cert.
denied, 280 U. S. 575 (1929).
20. In that event, the dividend would be non-taxable. Irving v. United States, 44 F.
(2d) 246 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Jackson v. Comm'r, 51 F. (2d) 650 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931);
United States v. Mellon, 281 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); and Alfred A. Laun, 26
B.T.A. 764 (1932).
21. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936).
22. In this connection, the Court apparently overlooked the legislative history of
§ 113(a) (9) of the 1928 Act pursuant to which the regulations involved had been prom-
ulgated. When the corresponding provision was introduced for the first time in the 1924
Act [§204(a) (9)], the Committee on Ways and Means stated: "Paragraph (9) also
covers the case of a distribution by a corporation of a stock dividend and provides that
the basis of the old stock shall be apportioned between that stock and the stock received
as a dividend. This rule is in accordance with the construction adopted by the depart-
ment and by the courts of the existing law." H. R. RE'. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924) 18. See also SEr. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) 19.
It is arguable, however, that this language had reference only to distributions of stock
made pursuant to a statutory reorganization, inasmuch as the section in question:
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Again Congress acted to meet this latest indication by the Court as
to the scope of the constitutional term "income" in connection with
stock dividends. It provided that:
"A distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders in its
stock or in rights to acquire its stock shall not be treated as a
dividend to the extent that it does not constitute income to the share-
holder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.
2 3
Even after the Koshland case, there was uncertainty as to whether
the stock dividend was actually taxable under the respective Acts from
1921 to 1934, inclusive, and, if not, what the basis of the dividend stock
was. These problems were soon resolved. In the Gowran case,2 the
Supreme Court held that the unmistakable command of the statute was
to exempt all stock dividends; that the cost of the dividend stock to
the stockholder receiving it was zero; and that the entire proceeds from
the sale of the dividend stock were taxable.
II. THE PROBLEMS
Paradoxically, while the Koshland and Gowran cases settled some
difficult legal problems, they left in their wake a host of new ones:
First, what was the taxable status of stock dividends under the Acts
prior to 1921 (when the statute attempted to tax all stock dividends)
and what was the propei basis of such stock?
Second, what adjustments were to be made in the case of stockholders
who had disposed of either their original or dividend stock prior to the
Koshland and Gowran decisions and had computed gain or loss thereon
in accordance with the now invalid regulations relating to basis?
Third, did Section 113(b) (1) (D) of the 1932, 1934 and 1936 Acts2 5
affect the determination in the Goran decision for stock held after
December 31, 1931?
(a) referred specifically only to distributions made pursuant to § 203(c) (1924 Act);
the latter section dealt exclusively with distributions arising out of reorganizations, where-
as ordinary stock dividends were treated separately in § 201(f) ;
(b) applied only to distributions made after December 31, 1923, from which time dis-
tributions pursuant to a reorganization could be made tax-free, while ordinary stohlz
dividends were tax-free from the very first income tax act; and
(c) was dropped in 1934 when § 203(c) (§ 112(g) in the 1928 and 1932 Acts) -was
also dropped, although ordinary stock dividends remained non-taxable under § 115(f)
until 1936.
23. REvzuJ- Acr Or 1936, § 115(f) (1). See H. R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936) 10; and SEr. Rarp. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 18.
24. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937). See also Helvering v. Pfeiffer,
302 U. S. 247 (1937). These cases involved the taxation of stock dividends under the
Revenue Act of 1928.
25. This section requires an adjustment to the basis of property for distributions
which were tax free under the law applicable to the year of such distribution.
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Fourth, what effect does a constitutionally taxable"0 but statutorily
tax-free dividend have on corporate earnings or profits?27
(a) Stock dividends prior to the 1921 Act.28 The impact of the
Koshland case on Eisner v. Macomber was to limit the effective scope
of the latter decision and to confine it strictly to its facts.20  Accordingly,
the provisions of the 1916 and 1918 Revenue Acts specifically taxing
stock dividends must now be regarded as invalid only to the extent that
they attempt to include constitutionally tax-free dividends within in-
26. The term "constitutionally taxable" is used herein to avoid the circumlocution
of describing this type of distribution as one which is taxable as income tinder tile Six-
teenth Amendment. As indicated by the Court in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189
(1920), all distributions might be taxable by apportionment.
27. It has been held that a constitutionally tax-free dividend is not a distribution of
earnings or profits and so does not diminish the corporation's earnings or profits. Nolde
v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 204 (1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 634 (1928). However, while
the distribution of a constitutionally taxable dividend may, by statute, be free of tax to
the stockholder at the time of receipt, it does constitute a corporate distribution and
may effect a reduction in the corporation's accumulated earnings or profits. See Hel-
vering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 244 (1937). For instance, under prior law where a
distribution of stock pursuant to a reorganization, without the surrender by the stock-
holder of his stock, was permitted free of tax [REvENuE Acrs OF 1924 and 1926,
§ 203(c); REVENUE AcTS OF 1928 and 1932, § 112 (g)] it was deemed necessary to
specify in the statute that earnings or profits were not diminished by such a distribu-
tion. REvENuE AcTS OF 1924 and 1926, § 203(g); REVENUE AcTs OF 1928 and 1932,
§ 112(h). See REVENUE Acr OF 1934, § 115(h). To resolve the question stated above,
Congress acted immediately after the Kosidand decision had indicated that some stock
dividends were taxable under the Constitution. In the 1936 Act it was provided that such
stock dividends shall not be considered a distribution of earnings or profits. REvENUH
Acr OF 1936, § 115(h). See also RF.VENvUE ACT OF 1938, § 115(h). In what appears to
be a masterpiece of wishful thinking (too often resorted to by the experts who draft
the reports), the Committee Report states that this rule is already part of existing law,
but "the recommended amendment is desirable in the interest of greater clarity." SEN.
REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 19. While such a provision operates fairly
where the basis of the old stock is allocable to the old and the new stock, it has an
anomalous result on the corporation where the stockholder uses a zero basis for the
dividend stock. If the basis of the old stock is allocated, the theory is that there has
been no real distribution of corporate earnings but that the stockholder's interest in the
firm is now represented by the dividend and the original stocks. On the zero basis theory,
however, there is no doubt that a distribution is made but the tax to the stockholder on
the fair market value of the distribution is merely postponed. Yet in the latter instance,
while the stockholder will in effect pay a tax on the distribution when he disposes of the
stock, the corporation will never be able under the present provisions of § 115(h) to
reduce its earnings and profits by the amount of that distribution.
28. Under Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 (1918) the Revenue Acts from 1913 to
1915, inclusive, must be regarded as extending tax exemption to stock dividends since
the applicable statute for that period was silent with respect to the taxation of such
dividends. The problems of basis for stock dividends received in that period under the
Koshland and Gowran cases are, therefore, the same as those arising in the period when
the statute specifically exempted dividends. This will be discussed infra p. 860.
29. MAGiLL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 67.
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come.3" Under these circumstances, the tax consequences of the receipt
of a constitutionally taxable stock dividend during the period from 1916
to 1921 were as follows: the stock dividend should have been included
in gross income at the time of its receipt. No adjustment should have
been made to the basis of the original stock by reasun of the receipt
of such dividend. If the stock dividend had been disposed of, the basis
for computing gain or loss thereon should have been its fair market
value at the time of the receipt. If the original stock had been disposed
of, the basis for computing gain or loss thereon should have been the
cost basis of such stock. However, prior to the Kosland decision, neither
the Treasury nor the taxpayers anticipated the limitations on the scope
of Eisner v. Illaconmber. Accordingly, many taxpayers receiving con-
stitutionally taxable stock dividends during this period did not pay a
tax on them at that time,3 and probably made adjustments to the basis
of the original stock by reason of the stock dividend.
The holding in the Koshland case to the effect that some stock dividends
were taxable under the Constitution upset this treatment of the dividend
- and in most instances operated to the detriment of the Treasury. For
example, if a taxpayer retained the dividend stock and sold the original
stock prior to the Koshland decision, the taxpayer's gain was increased
or his loss correspondingly decreased on that sale because the basis of
the original stock was adjusted by reason of the receipt of the stock
dividend. But on the subsequent sale of the dividend stock after the
Koshland case (or in a period still open when Koshland was decided),
the gain or loss would be computed using the fair market value of stock
at the time of receipt. Thus the taxpayer would get the benefit of the
full fair market value of the dividend stock as a basis on its sale, although
that amount was never reflected in his income at the time of the receipt
and although the basis of the original stock was only partially reduced. 2
30. A statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts, and yet valid as applied
to another. DuPont v. Comm'r, 289 U. S. 685, 688 (1933) ; and Dalmke-Walker Co. v.
Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 289 (1921). Section 900 of the Revenue Act of 1916 and
§ 1402 of the Revenue Act of 1918 provide that if any clause, sentence, paragraph or
part of the respective Act is held to be invalid, the decision shall not otherwise invalidate
the Act but shall be confined to the part thereof directly involved in the controversy in
which such judgment has been rendered. This provision has been stated more precisely
in the later statutes: "If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any
persons or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application
of such provisions to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby."
REvENuE Acr OF 1938, § 902.
31. Taxpayers probably included such dividends in income at the time of receipt in
accordance with the mandate of the statute that all stock dividends were taxable. Fol-
lowing Eimier v. Macomber, a great many of these taxpayers secured refunds whether
the dividend wmas constitutionally taxable or tax free.
32. This might be illustrated, concretely, as follows: suppose a common stockholder
received in 1918 a preferred stock dividend having a fair market value of $100. The
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Similarly, if a taxpayer retained the original stock and sold the divi-
dend stock prior to the Koshland decision, the taxpayer's gain would
be increased or his loss decreased because the dividend stock would have
taken some part of the original stock's basis rather than the fair market
value to which it was entitled. However, on the sale of the original
stock after the Koshland case, the stockholder would be entitled to use
the original basis of that stock unadjusted by reason of the stock
dividend."3
In the absence of specific legislation covering this problem, the Treasury
faced a loss in revenue. It could not rely upon its oft-resorted-to estoppel
doctrine against the taxpayer. As stated by the Court in the Salvage
case, since the income was not included in the year of its receipt because
of an "innocent mistake o.f law [and] there was no false representation
of fact; nothing gave support to the claim of estoppel."3 4 Furthermore,
the Government could not claim that a zero basis should be used on the
sale of the dividend stock under the theory of the Gowran decision. The
Court in the latter case was dealing with a dividend which was tax free
under the statute to the stockholder on its receipt. The "cost" of such
stock to the stockholder was zero. But the "cost" of a stock dividend
which is taxable under the statute is its fair market value whether or
not that dividend was actually included in gross income at the time of
receipt. 35"
Nor could it possibly be contended in this instance that Section 113
(b) (1) (D) of the 1932 and subsequent Revenue Acts was applicable.
That section provided that a proper adjustment was to be made in the
case of stock for the amount of distributions previously made which,
under the law applicable to the year in which the distribution was made,
common stock had a cost basis to the stockholder of $100 but after the receipt of the
dividend was worth $200. The $100 cost basis was allocated between the common and
preferred stocks in the respective ratio of 2 to 1, thus giving the common stock a basis
of $66+ and the preferred stock a basis of $33+. Suppose further that the common stock
was then sold in 1928 for $100 and the stockholder paid a tax on the $33+ gain. In 1936,
the stockholder sold the preferred stock for $100 but paid no tax since he was entitled
to use as a basis the fair market value of the stock at the time of the receipt, i.e., $100.
Thus while the total cost of both stocks was $100 and the total consideration received
was $200-resulting in a gain of $100 to the stockholder-he has paid a tax on only $33+.
33. More specifically, the result in this case would be as follows: suppose in the
situation assumed in note 32 supra, the preferred stock was sold for $100 in 1928. The
stockholder would have paid a tax on a $66+ gain. In 1936, the stockholder sold the com-
mon stock for $100. He would pay no tax thereon since he would be entitled to use tle
original basis of that stock, i.e., $100. Here, too, the net gain from both sales was $100
but a tax was paid on only $66+.
34. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1936), aff'g, 76 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936). See also Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Fed-
.eral Taxation (1935) 48 HARv. L. Ray. 1281.
35. See Daisy M. Ward, 29 B.T.A. 1251, 1254 (1934); Estate of Edwin D. Metcalf,
13 B.T.A. 236 (1928), aff'd, 32 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
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either were tax free or were applicable in reduction of basis. Neither
of these conditions exists in this instance. Here, under the law applicable
to the year in which the stock dividend was issued, the dividend was
not tax free. And, according to the Koshland case, there was no statu-
tory authority under the law applicable to those years for applying the
distribution to reduce the basis of the original stock."
Finally, the provisions of Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938
would offer no protection to the Treasury in this instance, for no such
adjustment is permitted in respect of any taxable year beginning prior
to January 1, 1932.17 And, in the situation under consideration at this
point, the erroneous omission from gross income took place in a taxable
year during the period from 1916 to 1921. Thus the Government found
itself "across the barrel" as a result of the Koshland decision and some
specific legislation was necessary to protect it.
(b) Stock dividends received between 1921 and 1936. It is now clear
that under the Revenue Acts in effect for the taxable period 1921 to
1935, inclusive, all stock dividends were received tax free (whether or
not such dividends were constitutionally taxable), that the basis of a
constitutionally taxable stock dividend was zero' s and that the original
stock's basis was not to be adjusted by reason of the stock dividend."
In the case of a taxpayer who had disposed of both the dividend stock
and the original stock in a taxable year prior to 1932, the correct tax
treatment was obvious: if the year in which the original stock had been
disposed of was still "open," the principle of the Koshland case was
applicable; if the year in which the dividend stock had been sold was
still "open," the principle of the Gowran case was applicable. However,
this treatment might produce tax consequences in these instances, which
would prove inequitable to either the Government or the tax-payer.
For example, the Treasury would be adversely affected tax-wise where
both stocks had been sold, gain or loss computed thereon by allocating
the original basis between both stocks in accordance with the applicable
regulations and, after the statute of limitations had expired for the year
in which the dividend stock had been sold, the taxpayer asserted that,
pursuant to the Koshland case, the entire original basis was available
for determining gain or loss on the original stock."° In the converse
36. The much neater question of whether § 113(b) (1) (D) is applicable to the stoel:
dividend issue arises in connection with the period from 1921 on when the statute did
make such dividends tax free. This problem is considered infra pp. 851-853.
37. REVE\uE AcT OF 1938, § 820(f). That there may be prohibitions of substance
in addition to limitations of time as to the applicability of the section in the stock divi-
dend situation will appear infra p. 853 et seq.
38. See note 24 supra.
39. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936).
40. The tax advantage to the taxpayer is obvious in this case: assume the stoczk-
holder had common stock wvith a cost basis of $100 and received in 1926 a preferred stool:
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situation, the taxpayer would be treated inequitably where the statute
of limitations had expired for the year in which the original stock had
been sold. In that instance, the Government would contend -with equal
propriety- that, pursuant to the Gowran case, the dividend stock had
a zero basis and that the entire proceeds on that sale were taxable.4'
In the case of a taxpayer who either received a stock dividend between
1932 and 1936, or who, having received a stock dividend between 1921
and 1936 disposed of either the original stock or the dividend stock
between 1932 and 1936, there were- after the Koshland and Gowran
cases - serious legal difficulties in addition to the possible inequities to
the taxpayer and the Government.
Foremost in this connection were the tax consequences to be accorded
Section 113(b) (1) (D) of the 1932 and subsequent Revenue Acts. Sec-
tion 113(b) provided that with respect to the basis of property:
"(1) General Rule. - Proper adjustment in respect of the prop-
erty shall in all cases be made-
"(D) in the case of stock . . . for the amount of distribution
previously made which, under the law applicable to the year in which
the distribution was made, either were tax-free or were applicable
in reduction of basis (not including distributions made by a cor-
poration, which was classified as a personal service corporation
under the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918 or 1921, out of its
earnings or profits which were taxable in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 218 of the Revenue Act of 1918 or 1921)."
Several questions arose with respect to the pertinence of this section
in the problem under consideration. Was the section applicable at all
dividend. At that time, the fair market value of the common stock was $100, and of the
preferred stock was $200. In accordance with the regulations [U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art.
1599] the $100 cost basis was apportioned between the common and preferred stocks in
the respective ratio of 1 to 2, thus giving the common stock a basis of $33+, and the
preferred stock a basis of $66-. In 1929, the taxpayer sold the dividend stock for $100,
and paid a tax on the gain of $33+. In 1931, the taxpayer sold the original stock for
$100 and paid a tax on the $66+ gain. Because of other adjustments to the 1931 return,
this year remained "open" until after the decision of the Supreme Court in the Koshland
case. Accordingly, instead of a $66+ gain on the sale of the original stock in 1931, there
would be no gain, since, under the Koshland decision, no adjustment to the original stock
would be permitted on account of the stock dividend. Here, there has been a total gain
to the stockholder of $100, and yet he has paid a tax on only $33.33.
41. The tax detriment to the taxpayer in this situation is equally clear. Suppose, in
the case considered in note 40 supra, that the original stock had been sold in 1927 for
$100, and a tax paid on the $66+ gain, computed in accordance with the applicable regu-
lations. Then in 1931 the dividend stock was sold for $100 and a tax paid on the $33+
gain computed in accordance with those regulations. If 1931 were still "open" when the
Gowran case was decided, the dividend stock would have a zero basis and the entire pro-
ceeds on that sale would be taxable. In this instance, there has been a gain to the tax-
payer of only $100 and yet he has paid a tax on $166.
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to the stock dividend basis problem? If it was, did it have any appli-
cation to the dividend stock as well as to the original stock? Moreover,
what type of adjustment was "proper" within the meaning of the section?
First. The section was designed to meet an entirely unrelated situation
-namely, to close the gap in the 1921 Act relating to the distribution
of earnings and profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913.42 'Moreover,
it was adopted when the generally accepted view was that, under Eisner
v. Macomber, all stock dividends were constitutionally exempt from tax
and the basis had to be apportioned between the original and dividend
stocks.
Nevertheless, while Section 113(b) (1) (D) was enacted for this
limited purpose and at a time when the Macomber decision was regarded
as applicable to all stock dividends, such considerations would not justify
a court "in departing from the unmistakable command embodied in the
statute."43 Here the terms of the section are sufficiently broad to embrace
other tax-free distributions including the stock dividends under consider-
ation. The adjustment is to be made under the statute "in all cases' for
the amount of distributions previously made which under the law ap-
plicable to the year in which the distribution was made were tax free.
Certainly no cavil can now be had with the proposition that a constitu-
42. H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 21 et scq.; SEar. REP. No. 655,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 29. See also 2 PAUL AXD M arEcs, LAw Or FEUEnAL 11-
co-,s TAXATION (1934) §§ 18.185-18.192. The situation in this respect was, as follows:
under the 1921 Act, a distribution of earnings and profits accumulated prior to farch 1,
1913, was tax free [REVE:N E Acr or 1921, § 201(b)], but there was no specific provi-
sion similar to that relating to the distribution of capital [REvEiun Acr or 1921, § 201(c) ]
which required such distribution to be applied against, and reduce the basis of the stck
in connection with which the distribution had been made. The Revenue Act of 1924
added a provision for the adjustment of basis in the case of tax-free distributions [Ruv-
ENxE Acr oF 1924, § 201(b)], but this provision -was held applicable only to such distri-
butions made in a taxable year subject to the 1924 Act. Louis D. Newman, 9 B.T.A.
158 (1927). Section 201(b) of the 1926 Act and § 115(b) of the 1928 Act vere held
to be similarly circumscribed. G. C. M. 6717, IX-1 Cum. BuLL 179 (1930). The 1928
Act attempted to "plug the loophole" by providing that the basis should be reduced by
the amount of previous distributions to the extent provided under the law applicable to
the year in which made. REvExrE AcT OF 1928, § Ill(b) (3). But this begged the ques-
tion since there xwas no certainty that the 1921 Act did require a reduction of basis.
Under such circumstances, the Board held that, in the absence of a specific statutory
provision, the cost of the stock-unadjusted for any distribution out of pre-March 1,
1913, earnings and profits made prior to January 1. 1924-was to be used as the basis
in computing gain upon the subsequent sale of the stock. See Carolyn S. McLean, 4
B.T.A. 487 (1926) ; and Stuart W. Webb, 5 B.T.A. 366 (1926). It was to remedy this
highly localized situation--entirely foreign to the stock dividend question-that § 113(b)
(1) (D) was enacted in the Revenue Act of 1932.
43. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 242-243 (1937). The principle should be
applied with care and only where the statute is unequivocally clear.
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tionally taxable stock dividend is a distribution.44 Nor can it now be
denied that under the law applicable to the year in which such distribu-
tions were made, - i.e., under the successive Revenue Acts from 1921
to 1934 inclusive- such distributions were tax free.45 Insofar as stock
dividends constitute income which could have been taxed, but which
either by legislative grace or because of lack of legislative prescience were
exempt, they are analogous to the distributions out of earnings and
profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913 4 0 -to which Section 113-
(b)(1)(D) clearly applies. Furthermore, there is only one stated ex-
ception to the all-inclusive language of the section, namely, distributions
by personal service companies under certain defined conditions. Accord-
ingly, the statutory language of Section 113(b) (1) (D) is so explicit in
this connection that recourse to its legislative history would seem pro-
hibited.
4 7
However, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
recently, in Frank J. and Hubert Kelly Trust et al. v. Commissioner,48
that the section is not applicable at all to the stock dividend situation.
In that case, the taxpayer contended that the basis of the dividend stock
(7%, cumulative, non-voting, redeemable preferred stock) should not
be zero -notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Gowran case - since Section 113 (b) (1) (D) of the Revenue Act of 1934
was applicable. The circuit court of appeals, in holding the section in-
applicable, drew a distinction between income arising in the form of
current earnings on the operation of a capital asset (ordinary income)
and income arising in the form of gain on the sale or other disposition
of such an asset (capital gain) -which, in the opinion of the court,
are materially different in fundamental nature and are treated differently
in the provisions of the Revenue Acts. This difference was apparently
regarded by the court as precluding the one type of income from affecting
the measurement of the other. Since the distinction is recognized in the
Revenue Acts, the court concluded that Sections 111, 112 and 113,
providing for the measurement of capital gain on the sale of stock, made
no allowance for adjustment by reason of ordinary income in the form
of dividends either in stock or cash.
The soundness of this reasoning is highly doubtful. The primary and
declared function of Section 113(b) (1) (D) was to provide an adjust-
44. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936) ; Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S.
238 (1937).
45. REVNUE Acr OF 1921, §201(d); REvu AcTs OF 1924 and 1926, § 201 (f);
REVENUE AcTs OF 1928, 1932 and 1934, § 115(f). See note 24 supra.
46. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918).
47. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935). This caveat is
resorted to usually to support a pre-determined construction contrary to the declared
intent of Congress.
48. Decided July 19, 1939. Opinion withdrawn Aug. 4, 1939, 106 F. (2d) 1002.
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ment to basis by reason of the tax-free distribution of earnings and profits
accumulated prior to March 1, 1913.11 This is "ordinary income" within
the classification of the court just as much as a taxable stock dividend."
Yet there is no question as to the applicability of Section 113 (b) (1) (D)
in that instance. Moreover, the court overlooked other instances in the
statute involving a receipt of ordinary income which Congress decided
to treat as a capital transaction and to require merely an adjustment to
basis-as, e.g., distributions by a corporation of stock or securities to
stockholders upon a reorganization (during the period from 1924 to
1934) or distributions out of depletion reserves based on discovery value
(during the period from 1924 to 1932)."' However, whether or not the
court's reasoning is correct in holding Section 113(b) (1) (D) entirely
inapplicable to the stock dividend issue, it is obvious that the Government
and taxpayer alike were faced with uncertainty in attempting to rely
on that section to bridge the hiatus in the law left by the Koshand and
Gowran decisions.
Second. Even if Section 113(b) (1) (D) were ultimately held to be
applicable to the stock dividend question, it is doubtful whether that
section offers a complete solution of the problem. It should be noted
that it provides merely for adjusting the basis of the original stock and
makes no provision as to any adjustment in respect of the dividend stock.
Nor may the dividend stock be brought within the scope of the section
by construing the term "adjustment" as smonymous with terms "ap-
portionment" and "allocation." Although the term "adjustment" may
have a meaning analogous to the terms "apportionment" and "allocation"
in the broad generic sense, 52 the terms have developed quite opposite
meanings for purposes of the Act. The term "adjustment" appears most
prominently at Section 113 (b) (1). Apparently as there used, that term
connotes the reduction of the original stock's basis by the fair market
value of the distribution. The legislative history of Section 113 (b) (1)-
(D) reveals this was the contemplated method of adjustment for the
items included in that paragraph. 3 Moreover, in other cases within the
49. See p. 850 supra.
50. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918).
51. Both discussed infra p. 855.
52. Webster defines the term "adjustment" as: "The calculation and settlement of
the several shares to be had or borne by various parties in respect of a liability, claim,
loss, or payment to be dividcd among the,. A means, as a mechanism, by which things
are adjusted one to another." (Italics supplied). Under this definition, it may b? con-
tended that the statutory term "adjustment" embraces the tax concepts of "allocation"
and "apportionment" so that it would be permissible to divide among the old and the
new stocks (i.e., allocate or apportion) the cost basis of the old stock.
53. When the provision was inserted in the law, it was stated: "The 1928 act re-
quired the basis of stock to be reduced by distributions which, under the law w,.hen made,
were applicable against basis. The new bill, in subparagraph (D), requires, in addition, that
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scope of Section 113(b) (1) in which an adjustment is prescribed, the
item mentioned is applied against and reduces to that extent the basis
of the property involved. 4
On the other hand, the terms "apportionment" and "allocation" have
been used in an entirely different sense under the Act. Those terms
appear in Section 113(a)." In construing the term "apportionment" the
Supreme Court stated: "To apportion is to 'divide and assign in just
proportion', 'to distribute among two or more a just part or share to
each' . . . ." And where the statute used the term, the original basis
has been divided between the old property and the new in accordance
with some just and equitable formula.
Finally, the fact that where the term "adjustment" is used, it is
geared only in terms of adjusting the original stock (without any refer-
ence to the corresponding adjustment to the dividend stock), while the
terms "apportionment" or "allocation" are coupled with a specific refer-
ence to both items, is significant. Such a divergence in drafting sections
so proximate in the 1932 Act as Section 113(a) (6), (9) and Section
113(b) (1) (D) compels a conclusion that the meaning of the term "ad-
justment" in the latter section is different from that of "apportionment"
or "allocation" in the former provisions.
The applicability of Section 113(b) (1) (D) to the dividend stock as
well as to the original stock has been considered by the Board of Tax
Appeals. The Board held that the section did not, by its terms, specify
an adjustment to the dividend stock. 7 In addition to the argument based
on the inapplicability of the language of Section 113 (b) (1) (D) to the
basis be reduced by distributions which were free of tax when made." H. R. REP. No. 708,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 22; SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 29. The
adjustment made in the case of distributions out of pre-March 1, 1913, earnings and
profits has always been that of reducing the original stock's basis by the amount of such
distributions, whether in cash or in kind.
54. For example, § 111(b) (2) of the 1928 Act provided that the "basis shall be di-
minished by the amount of the deductions for exhaustion, . . .," etc. In the 1932 Act,
this provision became part of § 113(b) (1) and the reduction of basis was referred to as
a "proper adjustment." The Committee reports reveal that no change in meaning was
intended by the shift from the term "diminished" to the term "adjustment" in the section.
Cf. also § 111(b) (3) of the 1928 Act which was also incorporated in § 113(b) (1) (D)
of the 1932 Act.
55. In § 113(a) (9) of the Revenue Act of 1932, it is specified that if stock or securi-
ties were distributed to the taxpayer in connection with a tax-free distribution pursuant
to a reorganization "the basis in the case of the stock in respect of which the distribu-
tion was made shall be apportioned, under the rules and regulations prescribed by the
Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, between such stock and the stock or
securities distributed." A similar use of the term "allocated" is made in § 113 (a) (6) of
the Revenue Act of 1932.
56. Manhattan Gen'l Equipment Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U. S. 129, 134 (1936).
57. Frank J. & Hubert Kelly Trust et al., 38 B.T.A. 1014 (1938); Albert E. Smith,
39 B.T.A. 80 (1939).
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dividend stock, the Board suggested some doubts as to the constitutionality
of the section if it were sufficiently inclusive. In that o nnection, the
Board stated that there is "considerable risk that the true doctrine of
the Koshland case may be to prevent apportioning to the dividend st*tcl
any part of the capital basis, even though expressly so directed by Co n-
gress, on the ground that 'in effect it converts an inctme tax into a
capital levy' . . . .""
The Board's fear seems to be groundless in this respect. It is lrtbally
more accurate to regard the quotation from the Koshland case as dictum.
This statement has subsequently been construed by the Supreme Court
as invalidating the apportionment of part of the original stock's basis too
the dividend stock, not under all circumstances, but only because in thi,
instance it was without statutory authority." Moreover, there has never
been any question as to the validity of other statutory provisions requir-
ing an adjustment of basis by reason of a tax-free distribution of inctme.
Two instances stand out:
1. In the case of a tax-free distribution of stock or securities pursuant
to a plan of reorganization,"0 the basis of the stock in respect of which
the distribution was made was to be apportioned between such stock and
the stock or securities distributed."' Such distributions, either of the
corporation's own stock,0' 2 or of stock in another corporation, w suld,
in the absence of the statutory exemption, constitute taxable income too
the recipient." Yet the Supreme Court had no difficulty sustaining the
statutory provision requiring the apportionment of the basis of the
original stock between both the original stock and the stock distributed
pursuant to the reorganization."
2. Mining royalties afford another instance of a valid statutory pro-
vision which has required a reduction of basis by the amount of a tax-
free distribution. Such royalties are income to the recipient,." but al-
lowance is made under the statute for depletion"' -and to that extent
58. Frank J. & Hubert Kelly Trust et at.. 38 B.T.A. 1014, 1019 (1938.
59. See Helvering v. Gowran. 302 U. S. 441 (1936); M. E. Blatt Co. v. United
States, 305 U. S. 267. 279 (1938). See also (1937) 25 CALIF. L. Rrv. 499.
60. REvEw-E ACrs or 1924 and 1926, § 203(c) : RrnvErxt-n Acts oF 1920 and 1932,
§ 112(g).
61. REvEN E Acrs oF 1924 and 1926. §2 04 (a) (9); REv\'E.-v Acrs or 1923 and
1932, § 113(a) (9).
62. This would occur where the statutory reorganization touk the funm f a recap-
italization. REvENuE AcTs or 1924 and 1926, §203(h) (1) (C); RFrE:NE Acm or- 1928
and 1932, § 112(i) (1) (C).
63. As to the corporation's own stock, see Koshland v. Helvering. 298 U. S. 441
(1936). As to stock in another corporation, see Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 (1918Q;
cases cited sutpra note 15.
64. 'Manhattan Gen'l Equipment Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U. S. 129 11936).
65. REvENUE Acr OF 1938, § 22(a) and corresponding provisions of prior Act'.
66. REvExuE AcT oF 1938, § 23(m) and corresponding provisions of prior Acts.
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the royalty is free from tax. The statute also provides in this instance
- exactly as does Section 113 (b) ( 1 ) (D) - that proper adjustment shall
be made to the basis of the recipient for depletion to the extent allowed
under the revenue laws."8 The constitutionality of such an adjustment
has always been assumed, without any question, by the Supreme Court.00
Yet the exemption of part of the royalty income for depletion- like
the exemption of stock dividends and of distributions out of pre-March
1, 1913 earnings-is said to be purely a matter of legislative grace. 70
However, even if all doubts are resolved as to the constitutionality
of the method prescribed in Section 113 (b) (1) (D) as applied to stock
dividends, nevertheless, the section is available to but a limited degree
- namely, in prescribing an adjustment only to the original stock. For
example, if the original stock was disposed of prior to 1932 and the
dividend stock was retained after 1932, Section 113(b) (1) (D) would
not permit the necessary adjustment.
Third. Another defect was obvious in Section 113(b) (1) (D) as the
solution to the stock dividend basis problem. Just what was meant by
the "proper adjustment" authorized by the statute? Did the term "ad-
justment" merely prescribe the reduction of the original stock's basis
by the fair market value of the dividend stock; or did it permit some
leeway in the amount by which the original stock's basis was to be reduced,
depending on the facts in the particular case?
As indicated above, the traditional method of adjusting stock in the
case of the types of distributions clearly within the scope of the section
has been to apply the fair market value of such distribution against the
basis of the old stock. Accordingly, this would probably be the "proper
adjustment" contemplated by the section in the case of stock dividends
-assuming the latter fell within the section. However, it is possible
that there is some "give" in the term "proper" so as to warrant adjust-
ments other than a strict reduction of the original stock's basis by the
fair market value of the dividend stock. Some hint of this elasticity in
the section was given in the Board's decision in the Kelly Trust case. It
was there pointed out that when a case arose in which the distribution
of the original stock was involved "a reference to 'proper adjustment' may
be the justification for treating that situation, when it arises, with such
fairness as the facts involved may require.
' '
17
67. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932).
68. REvENuE AcTs OF 1924 and 1926, § 202(b) (2); REvENuE ACT OF 1928, § 111 (b)
(2) ; and REVENUE AcTs OF 1932, 1934, 1936 and 1938, § 113(b) (1) (B).
69. See, e.g., Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co., 283 U. S. 301 (1931).
70. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938); Burnet v.
Thompson Oil & Gas Co., 287 U. S. 301, 304 (1938); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.,
240 U. S. 103 (1916). It is most difficult, however, to distinguish this case from a true
return of capital. MAGiLL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 317.
71. Frank J. & Hubert Kelly Trust et al., 38 B.T.A. 1014, 1019 (1938).
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For example, suppose the dividend stock was sold in 1932 and the
gain or loss thereon was measured by using as a basis some part of the
original stock's basis allocated to the dividend stock in accordance with
the provisions of the regulations now regarded as invalid. Then in 1934
the original stock was sold and the taxpayer claimed that the basis should
be unadjusted by any amount apportioned to the dividend stock on the
earlier sale. With respect to the original stock's basis, the Board might
hold that it should be adjusted only by so much of the tax-free distri-
bution which had escaped tax on the sale of the dividend stock (rather
than by the fair market value of the distribution). Such an adjustment
might be regarded as "proper" in that instance. -2
This array of the doubts arising with respect to the applicability of
Section 113(b)(1)(D) to the stock dividend basis problem was not
designed to pose a series of insolubles. Obviously, each could have been
resolved in due time by definitive judicial opinions. But these doubts
revealed the inadequacy of that section as an administrative technique
for coping with the problem at the present time. The experience of tax-
payers and Government alike in the prior history of the stock dividend
question was not conducive to having either of them place too sanguine
a reliance on the section.
Nor was any solution to this problem provided by that ingenious
product of the 1938 revenue draftsmen - Section 820 of the Revenue
Act of 1938. For example, suppose a taxpayer received a stock dividend
in 1932. He sold the dividend in 1934, computing gain or loss thereon
by attributing to the dividend stock a portion of the original stock's basis
in accordance with the regulations then in force. Then in 1938 he sold
his original stock and claimed the entire cost of that stock as the basis,
in accordance with the Koshland case. If this position were sustained by
a final determination,7" would any adjustment4 have been permitted
with respect to the dividend stock?
In the first place, Section 820(b) (5) would not require as an adjust-
ment the inclusion of the fair market value of the dividend stock in in-
come in the year of receipt, since under the applicable revenue statute
such stock dividends were tax free on receipt.75 Accordingly, with respect
to that item there was not an erroneous omission from the gross income
of the taxpayer in that year (1932) -one of the conditions precedent
for an adjustment under the section. Moreover, if the taxpayer's posi-
72. This conclusion would represent a middle ground betwveen the taxpayer's argu-
ment that under the Koshland decision no adjustment is warranted to the basis of the
original stock, and the Government's argument that under § 113(b) (1) (D) the basis
of the original stock should be reduced by the entire fair market value of the dividend
stock.
73. As defined in § 820(a) of the 1938 Revenue Act.
74. As defined in §820(b) (5) of that Act.
75. See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937).
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tion on the sale of the original stock were sustained, an adjustment would
apparently not be required with respect to the sale of the dividend stock
in 1934. Since the latter stock had, under the Gowran case, a zero basis,
it is arguable that the basis of the original stock did not depend upon
either the receipt or the sale of the dividend stock.7" Under these cir-
cumstances, a complete statutory solution was necessary if certainty and
equitable treatment were to be afforded the Government and taxpayers
with respect to the stock dividend basis problem.
III. THE SOLUTION
The solution to the stock dividend basis problem, adopted by Congress
in Section 214 of the Revenue Act of 1939, was "designed to afford a
clear and unequivocal statutory basis with respect to both past and future
taxable years for the rule of allocation upon which taxpayers, the Treasury
Department, and Congress have alike relied.""
The section does two things. First, it lays down as amendments to
the Internal Revenue Code a series of rules with respect to the allocation
of the basis of the original or dividend stock applicable to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1938."s Then it applies those rules for the
allocation of basis to the Revenue Act of 1938 and prior Revenue Acts."
The entire section thus forms a unified scheme -operating retroactively
as well as prospectively- whereby complete equity is achieved regardless
of when the dividend or the original stock is sold."° This solution seemed
most desirable since it restores the status quo on the stock dividend basis
problem to the situation in effect prior to the Koshland and Gowran
76. Maguire, Surrey and Traynor, Section 82o of The Revenue Act of 1938 (1939)
48 YALE L. J. 719, 768, n. 176. The application of Section 820 to the converse situation
is interesting: Suppose a constitutionally tax-free dividend had been erroneously included
in income at receipt. On the subsequent sale of the original stock, it was determined that
the stockholder should reduce the basis of that stock by the portion properly allocable
to the dividend stock. This would seem to be a proper instance for making an adju't-
ment under § 820(b) (5) in respect of the amount erroneously included in the gross
income of the stockholder in the year the dividend was received. See Kent, Mitlatlion
of the Statute of Limitations in Federal Tax Cases (1939) 27 CALIF. L. REV. 109, 110-111.
In such a case, the basis of the original stock must be apportioned between the dividend
and original stocks. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920) ; and Miles v. Safe
Deposit Trust Co., 259 U. S. 247 (1922). Accordingly, the erroneous inclusion of gross
income in the year the dividend was received was made in respect of a transaction upon
which such basis (i.e., the basis of the original stock) depends. There thus seems to be
a relationship between the prior inclusion of income and the subsequent determination
of basis, which is absent in the "zero" basis case considered in the text.
77. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 21. See also SE-. REP'. No, 648,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 3-4.
78. REVNUE AcT OF 1939, §214(a), (b), (c), (d).
79. REvE,;UE Acr OF 1939, § 214(e) and (f).
80. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 23.
858 [Vol. 49 . 841
19401 BASIS PROVISIONS FOR STOCK DIVIDENDS 859
decisions. It has the advantage of requiring little, if any, administrative
readjustment. It prevents inequitable treatment to the taxpayer who has
disposed of his stock on the basis of the former regulations. It minimizes
the possible loss of revenues to the Treasury from the shift in position
by taxpayers. And it provides a sound rule for the future. Section 214
will now be considered in detail.
Section 214 (a), (d) and (e)
Section 214(a) of the Revenue Act of 1939 amends the Internal
Revenue Code by adding to Section 113 (a) thereof, the provisions relating
to the determination of the basis of property, a new paragraph (19)."'
This states the set of rules operative in this instance prospectively. Sub-
paragraph (A) of the new provision gives the general rule; subparagraphs
(B), (C) and (D) give the exceptions to the general rule. The section
refers to the stock acquired by a stockholder in a corporation in a dis-
tribution by such corporation as "new stock;" it refers to the stock in
respect of whicl such distribution was made as "old stock." In a tax-
able year beginning after December 31, 1938. the following rules are
thus applicable with respect to the determination of the old and the new
stock's basis:
General Rule. If the new stock was acquired by a taxpayer after
February 28, 1913, then the adjusted basis of the old stock shall lie
allocated between the new stock and the old stock under regulations to
be prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the approval
of the Secretary of the Treasury. - This rule of allocation is to be
applicable, with certain stated exceptions in subparagraphs (B), (C) and
(D), to all cases where the new stock was acquired in a taxable year
beginning before January 1, 1936. whether or not such new stock was
constitutionally tax-free or constitutionally taxable; and to new stock
acquired in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1935, only if
such distribution was constitutionally tax-free.'
81. IxT. REv. CoDE § 113(a) (19) (A). (B). (C). (D).
82. T. D. 4938. IxT. Ruv. BtLL No. 39. at 16 (1939). with respect tu §214 uf the
1939 Act contains substantially the same provisions for the application of the allocation
principle to the old and the new stocks as were promulgated prior to the Koshland deci-
sion. Cf. T. D. 4938, § 20B.3 with, e.g.. U. S. Trea-. Reg. 86, Art. 113(a) (12)-1 (made
applicable to stock dividends by Art. 22(a)-8).
83. T. D. 4938, § 20B.1. see note 82 supra. The general rule would, of course, have
no application to new stock acquired in a taxable year beginning after Dec. 31, 1935,
which was constitutionally taxable to the stockholder upon its receipt. Under § 115(f) (1
of the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1938 and of the Internal Revenue Code, such stock divi-
dends are taxable upon their receipt, the new stock's basis is its fair market value at the
distribution date, and the old stock retains its basis without allocation by reason of the
distribution.
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It should be noted that the general rule in the new law provides for
the allocation of basis for constitutionally tax-free stock dividends re-
ceived either before or after January 1, 1936. While the principle of
allocation is undoubtedly applicable to such stock dividends even in the
absence of statute,84 some question might arise as to the particular method
of allocation to be used in a given case. The application of the principle
of allocation to this instance was thus probably made the basis of an
explicit statutory provision in order to give the Commissioner authority
to prescribe the particular rules and regulations for allocating the basis
of the old stock in this type of case.
The principle of allocation under the general rule would also seem
applicable to those stock dividends received in the period from 1916 to
1921 which were taxable both under the Constitution and tinder the
applicable Revenue Act. As indicated above,"' a stock dividend of this
type should have been returned as income at the time of receipt to the
extent of its fair market value. However, in many instances this was
not done because the decision in Eisner v. Macomber was regarded as
preventing the taxation of all stock dividends under the Constitution.
To prevent a double benefit to those stockholders - resulting from the
omission of the fair market value of the new stock from gross income
in the year of receipt and the use of the fair market value of the new
stock as its basis on future disposition- the general rule now provides
for an allocation of basis. The provision is academic to a great extent
in this instance. There are probably few taxpayers who received stock
dividends in the 1916-1921 period who still have either security at this
late date. However, the comparable provision in Section 214(e) relating
to prior taxable years will be of considerable importance in this con-
nection.
By a nicety of draftsmanship, the general rule is also made applicable
to- new stock which was received in a distribution where the stockholder
had an option to receive money or other property instead of such stock.80
The principle of allocation is now applied to the determination of the
basis of the new and the old stock if the "property was acquired by a
shareholder in a corporation and consists of stock in such corporation,
or rights to acquire such stock, .... ." It should be noted that the dis-
tribution is not characterized as a stock dividend. From the 1921 Act
to the 1934 Act, when the statute exempted stock dividends,87 the diffi-
culty was in determining whether a particular corporate distribution
84. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920) ; Miles v. Safe Deposit Co., 259
U. S. 247 (1922).
85. See pp. 846-847 supra.
86. See H. R. RFP. No. 885. 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 23.
87. REVENUE Acr OF 1921, § 201(d); RMNUE Acrs OF 1924 and 1926, § 201(f)
REVENuE Acrs OF 1928, 1932 and 1934, § 115(f).
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constituted a stock dividend within the meaning of that section if the
taxpayer had some form of an option to receive cash or other property
in lieu of the stock.ms
Section 214(a) of the 1939 Act definitely avoids stating the proposi-
tion in terms of a legal concept as, for example, "stock dividends." It
refers, instead, to the factual content of the distribution, vic., "property
was acquired" which "consists of stock in such corporation." Thus,
irrespective of whether prior to such acquisition the stockholder could
have elected to receive cash in lieu of the stock or whether he did receive
cash which he eo instante used to "purchase" stock in the corporation,
or whether any of the other deviations from the conventional corporate
stock dividend were resorted to, if the stockholder "ended up" with stock
in the corporation, he would seem to fall within the scope of the new
Section 113(a) (19) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code." And it will
only be necessary to consider the situation in the light of the tax treat-
ment previously accorded the transaction by the parties: if the distri-
bution was not included in gross income as a dividend at the time of
receipt, then the general rule applies; if it was included, then one of the
exceptions to the general rule, stated in the other subparagraphs of Sec-
tion 113(a) (19), is applicable.
While the principle of allocation is applicable not only to a dividend
in stock but also to one in stock rights, the application of the principle
may be different in the stock right case for there have been several changes
in the prior administrative treatment of rights. The Treasury first took
the position with respect to rights that the entire amount realized from
the sale of rights subscribed to for stock was income, but no income was
realized from the exercise of the right to subscribe." Following the
decision of the Supreme Court in Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Com-
pany of Baltimore,9 the regulations were amended to provide that if
the rights related to stock of the same character and preference as the
stock with respect to which the rights had been issued, then (a) if the
stockholder exercised his right the basis was to be the cost of the old
stock plus the subscription price divided by the total number of the
old and the new shares covered by the right; (b) if the stockholder sold
the rights, gain or loss on that sale would be determined by comparing
the sum of the sale price of the right plus the subscription price vth the
basis which would have been applicable under (a) to the new stock if
the stockholder had exercised his right. The gain in the latter instance,
88. See MAGILL, TAXALE Ioim (1936) 41-45.
89. The regulations interpreting § 214, however, apparently ignore the possibilities
of the section in this regard and the administrative provisions revert to considering the
section in terms of "an issue of stock dividends.' See T. D. 4938, § 20 B.1, note 82 supra.
90. U. S. Treas. Reg. 45 and 62, Art. 39.
91. 259 U. S. 247 (1922).
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however, was not to exceed the proceeds from the sale of the right. And
if this limitation was applicable, then the basis of the old stock was to
be determined as if no right had been issued. If the rights related to
stock of a different character or preference than the stock with respect
to which they were issued, then the principle of allocation regarded as
applicable to the determination of the basis of stock dividends was to
apply.1
2
Under the regulations applicable to the Revenue Act of 1926, this
position was further modified by the Treasury. It was provided that if
the rights were to subscribe to stock of substantially the same character
or preference as the stock with respect to which the rights were issued,
then (a) if the stockholder sold his rights, the basis of the old stock was
to be apportioned between the rights and the stock in proportion to their
respective fair market values at the time the rights were issued; (b) if
the stockholder exercised his rights, the basis for determining gain or
loss on the old stock was the same as under (a), and the basis of the
stock acquired by exercising the rights was that part of the cost of the
old stock assigned to the rights plus the subscription price. If the rights
were to subscribe to stock materially different in character or preference
from the stock with respect to which the rights were issued, the basis for
the old stock and the rights were to be determined in accordance with
the principle then regarded as applicable to determining the basis of stock
dividends. 3 The Department then ruled that the significant date in
connection with stock rights was January 1, 1925:0 stock rights acquired
prior to that date were to be treated in accordance with the provisions
of Regulations 45, 62 (amended) and 65; stock rights acquired after
that date were to be treated in accordance with the provisions of the
later regulations which were not to be applied retroactively." Moreover,
from 1928 on, taxpayers could, at their option, either treat the entire
proceeds on the sale of the rights as gain or else use an allocated basis."
The 1939 Act made no particular distinction with respect to the appli-
cation of the general rule in the case of rights acquired either prior or
subsequent to January 1, 1925. However, the Act did provide that the
"allocation [was] to be made under regulations which shall be prescribed
92. U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 39, as amended by T. D. 3402, I-1 Cumx. BULL. 63
(1922); U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 39, as amended by T. D. 3403, I-1 CuM. BuLL. 64
(1922); U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 39.
93. U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 39; U. S. Treas. Reg. 74 and 77, Art. 58; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 86, 94 and 101, Art. 22(a)-8.
94. The date with respect to which the Revenue Act of 1926 was to take effect.
REvENUE Acr OF 1926, § 286.
95. T. D. 4018, VI-1 Cum. BuL. 36 (1927), as amended by T. D. 4185, VII-1 Cum.
BuLL. 59 (1928).
96. See discussion p. 863 infra.
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by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary."" In the regu-
lations issued thereunder, the distinction has been maintained with respect
to the method of determining basis for rights acquired prior and subse-
quent to January 1, 1925." In view of the explicit Congressional intent
to validate the prior Treasury regulations of long standing with respect
to the stock dividend basis question," the retention of this distinction in
treatment of stock rights depending on the date of acquisition wuuld seem
to be a valid exercise of the Commissioner's authority to promulgate
regulations under the new law.
First Exception to General Rule. Subparagraph (B), which states the
first exception to the general rule, relates solely to the treatment of stock
rights. It provides that where stock rights were sold in a taxable year
beginning prior to January 1. 1939, and the entire proceeds of such sale
were entered in gross income for that year the basis of the old stock
shall be determined without reference to the allocation rule provided
for in subparagraph (A).
Because of practical difficulties in allocating the old stock's basis in
the case of some stock rights, the Treasury has from 1028 oin granted
taxpayers an option with respect to determining gain or loss on the sale
of stock rights: the taxpayer could either include the entire proceeds
from the sale of such rights in gross income for the year of sale, in
which event the basis of the old stock would be the same as though the
rights had not been issued; or the taxpayer could allocate to the stotck
rights a part of the old stock's basis."' ° This option was not available
with respect to stock rights sold prior to 1928.1"' The Commissioner had
also ruled that once the option was exercised the taxpayer was hound
thereafter.' 1
2
The validity of the option and its binding effect on a taxpayer who
had exercised it was unquestioned until recently. In Continental Rank
and Trust Conipany of Ne-, York v. United States,1"' the court refused
97. Ixv. RE%% CODE §113(a)(19)(A), as amended by RnFvn.xrE Act or 1939,
§214(a); REVENE Acr cr 1939, §214(e)(1.
9S. T. D. 4938, § 20B.4(a). note 82 supra. relates tu rights acquired after Dec. 31,
1924, and §20B.4(b) relates to rights acquired prior to Jan. 1. 12:5-buth restating in
substantially the same form the prior regulations applicable to these situations.
99. See H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. t1939) 5.
100. U. S. Treas. Reg. 74 and 77, Art. 580; U. S. Treas. Reg. ,, 94 and 101. Art.
22(a)-8. The provisions of regulations 94 and 101 relate only to stuck rights vhich
are not constitutionally ta-able as income since the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1938 and
the Internal Revenue Code provide that stock rights are taxMble on reccipt to the extent
permitted by the Sixteenth Amendment. REvaxEut Acts oF 1936 and 1938, and LI.T. Rv.
CODE § 115(f) (1).
101. G. C. M. 7021, VIII-2 Cum. Buit. 77 (1929).
102. G. C. M. 10170, XI-1 Cui. BuL. 15 (1932).
103. 19 F. Supp. 15 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
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to recognize as valid the option provided for in the regulations and to
hold the taxpayer to his election. In that case, a taxpayer had elected
to include the entire proceeds from the sale of stock rights in gross
income for the year of the sale. When the old stock was sold in a later
year, the taxpayer determined gain or loss by using as the basis the
cost of the old stock reduced by the amount apportioned to the stock
rights, and filed a claim for refund for the year in which the stock rights
had been sold.
The court sustained the taxpayer's claim for refund. It held that under
the Miles case a stock right of itself does not constitute income but that
only so much of the proceeds of the right upon its sale as represented
a realized profit over the cost of the right to the stockholder constituted
taxable income. The court went on to point out that Sections 111(a)
and 113(a) of the 1928 Act provided that the gain from the sale of the
property shall be the excess of the amount realized over the cost of the
property. Accordingly, it concluded that the portion of Article 58 of
Regulations 74 which granted an option to include the entire proceeds
from the sale in gross income was invalid since it exceeded and was
inconsistent with the law, citing, among others, the Koshland case. 104
It should be noted that the court found no specific basis provision
applicable to stock rights other than the general provisions of Sections
111(a) and 113(a) referring to the "cost" of property as the basis
thereof, and thus concluded that the cost of stock rights was not zero
but must be determined by the allocation principle. Yet in the Gowran
and Koshland cases, the Supreme Court in dealing with stock dividends
concluded that such basis provisions, namely, Sections 111 (a) and 113 (a),
militated against the use of the allocation principle but required instead
the use of a zero basis as "cost." If the decision of the district court
was correct in analogizing stock rights to stock dividends, as indicated
in the Miles case, 105 and if the rights were to acquire stock of a different
character or preference than the stock with respect to which such rights
were issued,1 6 then the conclusion of the court as to the use of an allo-
cated basis rather than a zero basis would seem to be diametrically
opposed to that reached in the Koshland and Gowran cases.
104. A similar conclusion was reached by the Board in Walter E. Buck, 40 B.T.A.
536 (1939), where the rights were issued to the common stockholders to subscribe to
additional common stock.
105. See Ramapo Inc. v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). But cf. Pal-
mer v. Comm'r, 302 U. S. 63, 71 (1937), where Mr. Justice Stone stated that "the mere
issue of rights to subscribe and their receipt by stockholders is not a dividend." If stock
rights do not under any circumstances constitute taxable income as indicated by the
Court's decision in the Pahner case, the analogy between stock rights and stock dividends
is no longer tenable.
106. It does not appear from the reported decision just what type of stock could be
acquired.
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Under the 1939 Act, the principle of allocating the old stock's basis
between the old stock and the stock rights is the only proper rule appli-
cable to stock rights sold in a taxable year beginning after December
31, 1938. In view of the availability of stock rights tables,' the prac-
tical difficulties of allocation no longer appear formidable, and the option
to use a zero basis for the stock rights will no longer be available in
the case of rights sold after that date.108 However, it is only fair that
taxpayers who, in the past have elected to use the option of a zero basis
for the rights, should not be compelled to reduce the basis of their old
stock because of the acquisition of such rights. Accordingly, the exception
in subparagraph (B) to the general rule would permit the use of the
zero basis for the stock rights sold in a taxable year beginning prior to
January 1, 1939 where the taxpayer had so electedlOD In that event, the
taxpayer will not be required to reduce the old stock's basis by any amount
attributable to the stock rights, and no part of the proceeds from the
sale of such rights shall ever be excluded from gross income for the
year of the sale." 0 However, this exception to the general rule is inap-
plicable if the taxpayer before June 29, 1939,"'1 asserted, either by a
claim for refund or a credit or otherwise, that part of the proceeds on
the sale of the stock rights should be excluded from gross income for
the year of sale of such rights. In the latter event, the general rule pro-
viding for an allocation of basis of the old stock will be applicable.
-112
Second Exception to Genzeral Ridc. Subparagraph (C) provides that
the general rule shall not apply to new stock acquired in a taxable year
beginning before January 1, 1936 if the taxpayer included as a dividend
in gross income for such year an amount on account of such stock and
such amount was not before June 29, 1939 excluded from the taxpayer's
gross income for such year. It will be recalled that, prior to the decision
of the Supreme Court in Eimier v. Macomber, the Revenue Acts of 1916
and 1918 purported to tax all stock dividends. Many taxpayers in strict
107. See stock right tables published in Sinclair, Murray & Co., Cap. Changes Serv.;
and Prentice-Hall, Cap. Adjustments Serv.
108. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 22. See also T. D. 4933,
§20B.4(a) (1), note 82 mpra.
109. U. S. Treas. Reg. 45 and 62, Art. 39 as originally promulgated required the
entire proceeds on the sale of rights to be included in income. Taxpayers who complied
with those provisions would also fall within the scope of this exception to the general
rule.
110. This provides a statutory basis for the optional treatment for past years and
will prevent a shift in position by a taxpayer who had elected to use a zero basis on the
sale of the rights- such as that resorted to by the taxpayers in Continental Banl: &
Trust Co. v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 15 (S. D. N. Y. 1937), and in Walter F. Bucl,
40 B.T.A. 536 (1939).
111. The date of enactment of the Revenue Act of 1939.
112. The regulations do no more than paraphrase the statute on this point. T. D. 4939,
§20 B.7(a).
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pursuance of the governing statute and the regulations promulgated there-
under included the fair market value of the dividend stock in gross income
for the year of receipt and paid the tax thereon.11 If the explicit con-
ditions of subparagraph (C) are met by such a taxpayer, this exception
to the general rule will be applicable to his case. There is still another
instance which might fall within the scope of this second exception to
the general rule. The taxpayer and the Treasury had gone along on the
assumption that the provisions of the Revenue Acts in effect from 1921
to 1936 exempted all stock dividends from tax. In 1933 the Board of
Tax Appeals held that the statutory provision exempting stock dividends
was only as broad as the constitutional limitation upon the taxation of
such dividends and that a dividend of common stock to a preferred stock-
holder was taxable both under the Constitution and the statute.114 It was
not until the decision of the Supreme Court in the Gowran case that the
question was definitely settled and the statute in effect from 1921 to
1936 was held to exempt all stock dividends. However, there was a
period from the Tillotson decision until the Gowran decision when the
Bureau adopted a policy of treating constitutionally taxable stock divi-
dends as income at the time of the receipt.""a Some taxpayers may have
accepted the Bureau's position in this connection and returned as gross
income in the year of receipt constitutionally taxable dividends received
during the period from 1921 to 1936.
If a taxpayer in either of the instances considered above"" still has
the new stock or the old stock and subsequently disposes of it, the basis
113. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Bowers. 5 F. Supp. 346 (S. D. N. Y. 1933), 68 F. (2d)
839 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 656 (1934). In that instance, the tax-
payer received a stock dividend in 1916 which he included in income for that year. He
sold both the old and the new stock in 1918 for an amount less than the sum of the
old stock's cost plus the par value of the new stock and claimed a loss in the amount
of the difference. Following the decision in Eisner v. Macomber, the Commissioner, in
1923, reaudited the taxpayer's 1918 return, allocated the old stock's cost basis between
the old and the new stocks and determined a gain rather than a loss on the sale in 1918.
The statutory period for filing a claim for refund for 1916, the year in which the tax-
payer had included the new stock in gross income, had expired in the meantime. The
Commissioner's allocation of basis in 1918 was sustained as proper by the Court and no
relief was afforded the taxpayer with respect to the barred year, 1916. The result in this
case has been characterized as highly unfair. See Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice
and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation (1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1283; Kent,
Mitigation of Statute of Limitations in Federal Tax Cases (1939) 27 CALIF. L. REV. 109,
n. 111. While these provisions of § 214 make the general rule inapplicable in the BigelozU
case-and thus render the Commissioner's action with respect to the year 1918 erroneous
-the section does not include any remedial provisions to permit a refund for the barred
year in which the old and new stocks were sold.
114. Cf. Tillotson Mfg. Co., 27 B.T.A. 913 (1933), aff'd, 76 F. (2d) 189 (1935).
115. See the arguments made by the Commissioner in H. C. Gowran et al., 32 B.T.A.
820 (1935) and Annie M. Pfeiffer, Memo Op., B.T.A., dated June 27, 1936.
116. The regulations give as examples a taxpayer who included the new stock in
gross income either pursuant to § 201(c) of the 1918 Act, or as a result of the decision
in the Koshland case. See T. D. 4938, § 20B.7(b), see note 82 supra.
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of that stock will not be determined by the principle of allocation specified
in subparagraph (A). Instead if the old stock is now sold, its basis will
be cost unadjusted by any amount applicable to the new stock; if the
new stock is sold, its basis will be its fair market value at the time if
distribution."'
The application of subparagraph (C) might be noted in another case.
Suppose a taxpayer received a stock dividend in the period from 1916
to 1921 and pursuant to the clear mandate of the statute returned the
fair market value of the stock as gross income in the year of the receipt.
Then the taxpayer sold the old stock and computed gain or loss on its
original basis unreduced by any amount attributable to the new stock.
The Bureau in reliance on Eisner v. .31aconiber later determined that flir
purposes of determining gain or loss on the sale of the old stock the
original basis must be allocated to both the old and the new stocks even
though the new stock had previously been reported as income. The tax-
payer still retains at this date the new stock." 8
Subparagraph (C) does not achieve complete equity in this situation.
for it does not reopen the year in which the stock dividend was included
in income and permit a refund of the tax on the amount so included.
However, it does effect a partial restitution in such a case by permitting
the use of the fair market value of the new stock at the time of its receipt
as the basis on subsequent disposition. Thus if the dividend stock in
this instance had been of a type which was constitutionally tax-free, then
the taxpayer will be "made whole" at least to the extent that the fair
market value of the new stock (now used as a basis) exceeds the part of
the old stock's basis which would have been allocated to the new stock
in strict compliance with Eisner v. Macoinber.
If in the instance given above, the dividend stock had been received in
the period from 1921 to 1936, and had been of a type which was con-
stitutionally taxable then, the taxpayer will be restored to the extent that
the fair market value of the new stock at the time of receipt (its basis
under the amendment) exceeds the zero basis required by the Gowran
decision for such stock and minus the amount of the tild stock's basis
which had erroneously been deducted from the old stock prior to the
Koshland decision in determining gain or loss on the sale of that stock.110
117. See H. R. REP. No. SS5, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 22. The regulations, hu,,-
ever, provide that the basis of the new stock "shall be the amount equal to that at which
such stock dividend or stock right was included in gross income fur the year of it,
acquisition." T. D. 4938, § 20B.7(b), see note 82 supra. There may be a material dif-
ference between the latter figure and fair market value. The statute is silent in this
respect.
118. This case is similar to Bigelow v. Bowers, S F. Supp. 346 (S. D. X. Y. 1933),
except for the fact that the stockholder in this instance still retains the new stoic. In
Bigclow z. Bowers, both stocks had been disposed of in the same year.
119. This case may be illustrated more specifically. Suppose the cost of te old stuck
was $100. A constitutionally taxable stock dividend was issued in 1928 having at that
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Subparagraph (C) has also taken out of the general rule still another
type of case. As indicated above, there has been considerable difficulty
in distinguishing between a true stock dividend and a dividend in which
the stockholder has a real option to take cash or stock. It has also been
pointed out that Section 113 (a) (19) seemed sufficiently broad to include
a corporate distribution which consists of stock whether or not under
the applicable decisions such a distribution would be regarded as a true
stock dividend or an optional dividend. 2 In such a case subparagraph
(A) provides for an allocation of basis under the general rule. However,
if the stockholder included an amount on account of such stock in gross
income for the year of receipt and such amount was not thereafter ex-
cluded from gross income for such year, subparagraph (C) permits the
use of the amount so included in gross income as the basis of the new
stock. 2'
It should be noted that subparagraph (C) does not apply where the
new stock was received in a taxable year beginning after December 31,
1935. The statute therefore may not afford the necessary coverage in
cases of this character. For instance, under the Revenue Acts in effect
from 1936, all stock dividends are taxable to the extent permitted by
the Sixteenth Amendment. 2 2 Just what types of stock dividends are
thus taxable income is not clearly settled.' 23 It has also been specifically
provided in the statute since 1936 that if a stockholder has an election
to receive a distribution either in constitutionally tax-free stock or in
time a fair market value of $50.00. The ratio of the fair market values of the old and
the new stocks at that time is, respectively, 2 to 1. Thus on the principal of allocation
the old stock has a basis of $66+ and the new stock of $33+. The old stock was sold in
1930 and gain or loss computed thereon, using an allocated basis. The taxable year 1928
remained open because of other items; and in 1933, following the Tillolson decision, the
Bureau included in the taxpayer's gross income for 1928 the fair market value of the new
stock. The statutory period for filing a claim for refund for that year expired prior to
the decision of the Supreme Court in the Gowran case. The taxpayer now sells the new
stock in 1939 after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1939. His basis for the new
stock under subparagraph (C) is $50.00-its fair market value at the time of the receipt
in lieu of zero which would have been the proper basis under the Gowran decision in
the absence of a statutory provision. However, the taxpayer has used a $66+ basis in-
stead of the $100 basis on the sale of the old stock. So his benefit under subparagraph
(C) is $50.00 (the difference between the $50.00 basis and the zero basis) minus $33+
(the amount erroneously deducted in the light of the Koshland case from the basis of the
old stock)-or a net restituition to that taxpayer of $17+.
120. See the discussion supra p. 860 et seq. under the gneral rule.
121. The regulations are silent with respect to this type of case under subparagraph
(C), as well as under the general rule.
122. REVENuE Acrs oF 1936 and 1938, and INT. Rxv. CoDn § 115(f) (1) (1939).
123. The Kelly Trust case involved one of those borderline cases. There, only com-
mon stock was outstanding. A new class of preferred was distributed to the common
stockholders. The stockholders thus held both stocks in exactly the same proportion.
They contended this was not a constitutionally taxable dividend. The Board and the
circuit court held that it was.
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cash, property or constitutionally taxable stock, then the distribution will
constitute a taxable dividend regardless of the medium in which paid. -
This provision does not resolve the difficulty of determining whether a
true option exists in a given case. Many of the factors presented in the
old litigated cases might still cast considerable doubt on whether the
taxpayer has an election within the meaning of this section.
Suppose, then, that after January 1, 1936 a taxpayer receives a dis-
tribution which consists of stock of doubtful taxability under the Con-
stitution. Or, suppose that he receives, pursuant to some form of elec-
tion, stock which is clearly constitutionally tax-free. He regards the
distribution in the first instance as taxable within the meaning of Section
115(f) (1) ; or in the second instance as taxable under Section 115(f) (2).
Accordingly, he includes the fair market value of the distribution in
income for that year. Later the Bureau, either on its own initiative or
pursuant to a court decision successfully maintained by another stock-
holder, determines that the stock dividend in the first case was not con-
stitutionally taxable, or that the distribution in the second case was not
received pursuant to a bona fide election; that either distribution should
have been excluded from gross income in the year of receipt; and that
the basis of the old and the new stocks should be determined by the
allocation principle in accordance with the general rule in Section 113
(a) (19) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code.' In the case of this par-
ticular taxpayer, however, the year in which the dividend was included
in gross income is now barred. While subparagraph (A) is sufficiently
all inclusive to provide for the application of the general rule in the
case of a distribution of this character made after December 31, 1935,
subparagraph (C) is not coterminous with subparagraph (A) in this
respect and does not provide the necessary exception to the general rule
where the taxpayer erroneously included in gross income the amount
of the distribution received in a taxable year beginning after December
31, 1935.2;
Third Exception to General Rule. Subparagraph (D) makes the rule
of allocation inapplicable where either the old or the new stock was sold
or otherwise disposed of in a taxable year beginning before January 1,
1936, and the basis was definitively ascertained by a method other than
that of allocation. The determination recognized by the statute as binding
in this respect must have been made by either (1) a decision of a court
124. REVENUE Acts or 1936 and 1938, and I-rr. REv. CoDE § 115(f) (2) (1939).
125. If the new stock were received in a ta.-ruble year beginning before January 1,
1939, the basis provisions would be determined by the general rule in accordance with
subparagraph (1) of § 214(e) of the Revenue Act of 1939 which is similar to § 113(a)
(19) (A).
126. It may be that adequate safeguards are assured the stockhlder in this situation
by the provisions of § 820. See note 76 supra.
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or (2) a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals or (3) a closing agree-
ment-and must have become final before September 26, 1939.121
The exception in subparagraph (D) is thus applicable to taxpayers
who had disposed of their old stock and by one of the specified forms
of final determination were permitted, pursuant to the Koshland deci-
sion, to use the original basis of the old stock unadjusted for any amount
attributable to the new stock. It is applicable as well to taxpayers who
had disposed of their new stock and by one of the specified forms of
final determination were required, pursuant to the Gowran decision, to
use a zero basis for the new stock. And it may also be applicable to
some cases where the Bureau has applied Section 113(b) (1) (D) and
the taxpayer has entered into a closing agreement consenting to such
action. 128  (Section 113(b) (1) (D) was not applied in litigation).
The provisions of subparagraph (D) were designed to insure that,
in the few court or closing-agreement cases in which the basis of the
old or new stock was determined by a method other than the allocation
principle, the taxpayer involved would be enabled to recover his full
cost- but no more-upon a subsequent sale or other disposition of
the remaining class of stock. 129 To this end the Treasury now requires
by regulation that in cases where the subparagraph is applicable, the
basis for determining gain or loss for the remaining shares shall be
fixed in a manner consistent with the prior determination.' 30
No specific authorization to prescribe by regulation the method of
determining the basis for such remaining shares appears in the statute.
The regulation in this respect is thus merely interpretative, without the
force and effect of law.' Accordingly, there is a theoretical legal possi-
bility that the soundness of the interpretation may be questioned. From
a practical viewpoint, however, this possibility has little significance.
127. The ninetieth day after the date of enactment of the Revenue Act of 1939. This
limitation will thus make the general rule applicable to the case of Frank J. and Hubert
Kelly Trust v. Comm'r, 38 B. T. A. 1014 (1938), aff'd, C. C. A. 8th, July 19, 1939, and
to the case of Albert E. Smith, 40 B.T.A. 80 (1939), which followed the Kelly Trust
case. The opinions in these cases have been withdrawn.
128. For example, assume that a taxpayer received a stock dividend in 1932, In 1935
he sold the old stock. By a closing agreement between the taxpayer and the Treasury
department it was determined that the fair market value of the new stock at the date of
distribution should be applied against and reduce the original cost of the old stock in
accordance with the provisions of § 113(b) (1) (D) of the Revenue Act of 1934 and that
gain or loss on the old stock should be computed accordingly. If the new stock was
disposed of in 1939, the general rule in subparagraph (A) of § 113(a) (19) would not be
applicable since, by subparagraph (D), the basis for determining gain or loss on the
sale of the old stock was ascertained by a method other than that of allocation,
129. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 22.
130. T. D. 4938, § 20 B.7(c), see note 82 supra.
131. See Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case (1940) 40 COL. L.
Ray. 252.
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If the regulation is not controlling as to basis, such cases as are ex-
cepted from the new statutory scheme by reason of subparagraph (D)
will continue to be governed by prior law. Thus taxpayers whose
basis as to one class of stock has been finally determined by litigation
or closing agreement pursuant to the Koshlanzd or Gowran rules will
now have, by reason of those decisions, the full basis if the original shares
remain and a zero basis if the dividend shares remain -precisely the
result reached if the regulation is applied. Moreover, in the third type
of case, that of the closing agreement applying Section 113(b) (1) (D),
such agreements as a matter of administrative practice would invariably
have fixed the basis for both the original and dividend shares by a method
which would allow recovery of the full cost or other basis and no more.
It should be noted that subparagraph (D) applies only where a basis
other than allocation was used on a prior sale of stock and that basis
was determined by one of the three specified forms of final determina-
tion. However, the subparagraph is not, by its terms, applicable to a
case where, on the prior disposition of stock, a basis other than allocation
was used and such basis became final- not pursuant to one of the
specified forms of determination -but by reason of the operation of
the statute of limitations. For example, if on the prior disposition of
old stock the full original basis for determining gain or loss thereon
was used and the year in which such stock was sold became barred, the
taxpayer would still be entitled to an allocated basis under subparagraph
(A) with respect to the new stock. Conversely, if on the prior dis-
position of the new stock, a zero basis was used and the year of that
sale became barred, the Treasury could assert the use of an allocated
basis for the old stock under subparagraph (A). Or, if the application
of Section 113(b) (1) (D) in determining the basis of the old stock
was not made in a closing agreement and the year in which the old
stock was sold became barred, the taxpayer would be subject to the
provisions of subparagraph (A) with respect to the basis of the new
stock. None of the exceptions to the general rule would seem to afford
the necessary relief in this instance. 3 ' It is possible, however, that this
omission may not have been inadvertent. Such cases were extremely
infrequent in view of the general acceptance of the validity of the regu-
lation prior to the Koshland case and the recency of that decision.
132. Under subparagraph (A) the method of allocation is to be made "under regula-
tions which shall be prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.'
It may be arguable that the Commissioner can, under this subparagraph, control tle ex-
tent to which the method of allocation shall be applied so as to reach an equitable result
in the above cases which fall outside the scope of subparagraph (D). However, the pos-
sibility of such a power in the Commissioner -was not asserted in the regulations issued
under the section. T. D. 493S, § 20B.3, see note 82 supra. As to whether some relief in
these cases might be available under § 820, see discussion supra 857-458.
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An interesting case under subparagraph (D) arises where only part,
and not all, of the new stock or the old stock was disposed of prior to
January 1, 1936, and the basis was determined as specified in subpara-
graph (D) by a method other than that of allocation. Is subparagraph
(D) applicable to that case; and to what extent? It might be contended
that the statutory reference to "the new stock or the old stock" relates
to the entire number of shares distributed as a dividend and to the total
number of shares with respect to which such stock was distributed.
Therefore, unless the total number of shares of either class was dis-
posed of as described in subparagraph (D), it might be argued that
these provisions were inapplicable and that the general rule was control-
ling. Such a result, however, is unnecessarily literal. The more reason-
able interpretation is that "the new stock or the old stock" referred to
in subparagraph (D) relates to any part of either stock disposed of in
the described manner. Accordingly, if one-half of the dividend stock
was so disposed of and a method other than allocation was used in
determining the applicable basis, subparagraph (D) would seem to require
a consistent treatment of basis for so much of the original stock as is
attributable to that part of the stock dividend. The general rule would
be applicable to the remainder of the old stock and the new stock. The
same would be true in the converse situation where part of the original
stock had been disposed of -that part of the dividend stock attributable
to those original shares would be subject to subparagraph (D), the
remainder to the general rule.
As indicated above, Section 214(a) sets forth the foregoing rules
as an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, namely, Section 113-
(a)(19). However, by Section 214(d), that amendment is only appli-
cable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1938. Section
214(e) of the Revenue Act of 1939 restates the above rules for pur-
poses of the Revenue Act of 1938 and the prior Revenue Acts. 3' Sub-
paragraph (1) of Section 214(e) is comparable to subparagraph (A)
of Section 113 (a) (19) relating to the general rule; and subparagraphs
(2), (3), and (4) of Section 214(e) state the same exceptions to the
general rule as appear in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) of Section
113(a) (19).
The retroactive provisions of Section 214(e) were designed to com-
plement the prospective relief provided for in Section 2 14(a). Other-
wise, complete equitable treatment to taxpayers and the Treasury would
not have been assured in some cases. 13 4 However, the retroactive appli-
133. REVENuE Acr OF 1939, §214(e).
134. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer received a stock dividend in 1932. In
1933, he sold the old stock and, under the regulations then regarded as applicable, gain
or loss was computed by assigning to such old stock a part of the original basis deter-
mined under the allocation principle. In 1938 that taxpayer sold the new stock and, under
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cation of the provisions under Section 214(e) raises a constitutional
issue: does the fact that the section amends every Revenue Act since
the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment - thus reaching back 26 years
- transgress the due process requirement of the Constitution? The test
is whether in view of the nature of the tax and the circumstances in
which it is laid the retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive
as to violate the constitutional limitation.135 In this connection, it is
material whether the taxpayer could reasonably have anticipated the
particular tax at the time he effected the transaction which later became
the subject of the tax.'
The application of Section 214(e) in the various situations might
thus be considered. Where the taxpayers sold the original stock prior
to the Koshland and Gowran decisions, using an allocated basis, Section
214(e) obviates the use of the "zero" basis for the dividend stock as
required by the Gowran case. The section could hardly be regarded as
harsh or oppressive in that instance. Where the taxpayer sold the divi-
dend stock prior to the Koshland and Gowran decisions, using an allo-
cated basis, the section forecloses using the entire original basis for the
old stock as permitted by the Kosidand case. But the provisions would
not seem burdensome in this instance. The taxpayer is not being deprived
of the recovery of any part of his basis. No element of surprise exists
in that case since the statute merely validates the regulations on which
he had previously relied in computing gain or loss on the dividend stock.
Moreover, the section might be sustained in that case as an effort on
the part of the legislature to cure a defect arising from the mistake of
officers purporting to administer the law. 37
In the case of a taxpayer who disposed of the dividend and original
stocks after the Koshland and Gowran decisions but before the 1939
the applicable decisions, was required to use a zero basis in computing gain or loss.
Clearly such a tax-payer would not have recovered his entire cost tax-free. Conversely,
in some cases the Treasury might be treated unfairly. Assume that in the case stated
above the taxpayer had sold the new stock first and determined gain or loss thereon
by assigning to such new stock a part of the old stock's basis determined under the allo-
cation principle. In 1938, he sold the old stock and under the Koshliand decision .vas per-
mitted to use the entire original cost in computing gain or loss thereon without any ad-
justment for the part of that basis previously used in computing gain or loss on the sale
of the new stock. Here the Treasury would not recover a tax on the full amount of the
gain realized by the taxpayer.
135. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927); Coolidge v. Long, 2S2 U. S. 5;q2
(1931) ; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 (1927) ; Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S.
440 (1928) ; cf. Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935) ; White v. Poor, 296 U. S.
98 (1935).
136. 'Milliken ct al. v. United States, 283 U. S. 15 (1931).
137. United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370 (1907) ; Rafferty v. Smith, Bell &
Co., Ltd., 257 U. S. 226 (1921); Charlotte Harbor & Northern Ry. v. Wells, 29
U. S. 8 (1922) ; Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409 (1931); ef. Hecht v. Malley, 265
U. S. 144, 164 (1924).
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Act, the situation is more difficult. The taxpayer may have relied on
those decisions in determining his course of conduct. Now the 1939 Act
prescribes an entirely different method of computing his gain or loss,
which in view of the finality of the Supreme Court's decisions, he could
not have reasonably anticipated. The harshness of the measure may
result either from the taxation of gain at a higher rate or from the
inability to offset an increased loss by any capital gain. The change was
not justified because of any defect in the statute. Such a taxpayer would
only recover his original cost- and no more. The Treasury would
also get the tax on the full share of the gain. Nor is the statute merely
curative of an administrative defect.' The prior regulations were not in
force after the Koshland case and the Treasury did not attempt to enforce
them during this period.
While these factors are material, it is doubtful whether the Supreme
Court would find the statute invalid on the ground of retroactivity in
the case above. No income tax act has ever been struck down on this
ground.'3 9 For practical purposes the argument of retroactivity "is as
dead as wager of law."' 40 However, while the constitutional argument
may not be availing, there would seem to be no basis, as a matter of
legislative policy, for upsetting this case. The Treasury was adequately
protected and the taxpayer acted in reliance on the decisions. This might
well be the subject of a further exception to the general rule prescribed
in Section 2 14(e) (1). With this possible exception, Section 214(a)
and (e) afford a complete and equitable solution to the basis problem
in the stock dividend cases.
Section 214 (b)
In addition to the provisions of Section 214(a) and (e) which contain
the statutory scheme as to the basis of the old and the new stocks, other
provisions were necessary to assure that those sections were mutually
exclusive from existing sections of the law. 4' Section 214(b) of the
138. See generally, Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 660.
139. See Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 592, 597.
See also the exhaustive collection of authorities in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 447-451 (1928). The Supreme Court
has recently sustained a 1935 Wisconsin statute taxing dividends received in 1933 which
under the prior law applicable to 1933 had been exempt. Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S.
134 (1938).
140. See Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation (1935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 592.
141. It should be noted that no amendment is made in § 214 of the Revenue Act of
1939 to § 113(b) (1) (D) of the Revenue Act of 1932 and of subsequent Revenue Acts,
including the Internal Revenue Code. This would hardly seem necessary in view of the
fact that if part of the basis of the old stock is allocated to the new stock no further
adjustment of the old stock's basis on account of the tax-free distribution of the new
stock would be proper. H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 23.
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Revenue Act of 1939 amends Section 115(d) of the Internal Revenue
Code so as to provide that the basis of the old stock shall not be reduced
under that section by the amount of a distribution which is exempt from
tax under Section 115 (f) (1), relating to constitutionally tax-free stock
dividends.
Section 115(d) formerly provided that if a distribution was not out
of earnings and profits, it was applied against and reduced the basis of
the stock; any excess of such distribution over basis was taxable as gain
from the sale of property.
Since the 1936 Act, it has been provided that a stock dividend which
was not constitutionally taxable shall not be regarded as a distribution
out of earnings or profits." Thus if cumulative effect is given to Sec-
tion 115(d) and (h) of the Internal Revenue Code, it might be argued
(1) that a constitutionally tax-free stock dividend was not a distri-
bution out of earnings or profits either accumulated since February 28,
1913 or of the current taxable year; (2) that, therefore, it was not a
dividend within the meaning of Section 115(a); and (3) that it con-
stituted a distribution within the scope of Section 115(d) which necessi-
tated the reduction of the basis of the old stock by the amount of the
stock dividend.Y
43
There would thus be in the Act conflicting provisions relating to
the basis of constitutionally tax-free stock dividends: (1) the provisions
of Section 113(a)(19) requiring the application of the allocation prin-
ciple; and (2) the provisions of Section 115(d) which seemingly require
the basis of the old stock to be reduced by the amount of the new stock.
It was to clarify this situation that Section 214(b) of the 1939 Act
amended Section 115(d) of the Internal Revenue Code by providing that
the latter section shall not be applicable to a distribution which under Sec-
tion 115(f)(1) is not treated as a dividend.'44
However, it should be noted that by Section 214(d) this amendment
is applicable only to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1938
and does not make any amendment to Section 115(d) of the 1938 Act
and the corresponding provisions of prior Revenue Acts. This might
be of importance.
For instance, Section 115(d) of the Revenue Act of 1934 and the
corresponding provisions of prior Acts required a reduction of basis
142. REvEruE Aces OF 1936 and 1938, and INT. REV. CoDE § 115(h).
143. It is probable that under Eisner sp. Macomber the excess of the fair market value
of the new stock over the basis of the old stock could not be taxed as "a gain from the
sale or exchange of property" at the time of distribution as provided under Section
115(d). But the validity of that section would probably be sustained to the extent that
the fair market value of the new stock did not exceed the basis of the old stock. I:;'.
Rnv. CODE §380Z
144. H. P_ REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 23.
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by the amount of a distribution which was not out of earnings or profits.
Section 115(a) defined a "dividend" as a distribution out of earnings
or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913. Section 115(f) merely
provided that stock dividends were not taxable. However, Section 115-
(h) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1936 provided that a distribution of
stock whether before, on, or after January 1, 1936 which "was not
subject to tax in the hands of such distributee . . . because exempt
to him under Section 115(f) of the Revenue Act of 1934 or a cor-
responding provision of a prior Revenue Act" shall not be considered
a distribution of earnings or profits. Accordingly, a constitutionally
taxable stock dividend made prior to 1936 was not a distribution out
of earnings or profits, was includable within the scope of Section 115 (d),
and should have been applied against the basis of the old stock.
Of course, the statute now definitely provides under Section 214(e)
that for taxable years prior to 1939 the principle of allocation shall be
applicable to stock dividends. An argument might well be made that
this provision, specifically relating to stock dividends- rather than the
general provision of Section 115(d) - is controlling. However, a pro-
vision similar to Section 214(e) now also exists in the statute specifically
relating to the basis of stock dividends for taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1938. And, if a clarifying amendment to Section 115(d)
of the Internal Revenue Code was deemed necessary for taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1938, even though the statute also con-
tained a specific provision as to the allocation of basis in the stock divi-
dend cases, the failure to make a similar provision in prior years might
be regarded as significant.
Section 214(c) and (f)
It was necessary in the 1939 Act to "round out" the basis treatment
provided for therein with some provision as to the holding period appli-
cable to the stock dividend. Accordingly, Section 214(c) and (f) of
the Revenue Act of 1939 provides that, in the case of stock or stock
rights received as a dividend where the basis of such stock or rights
is determined by the allocation principle, the Commissioner may prescribe,
in properly promulgated regulations that in determining the period under
all the Revenue Acts for which a taxpayer has held such stock or rights,
there shall be included the period prior to such distribution for which
he held the stock upon which such distribution was made.
141
The period of time for which property has been held by a taxpayer
is, of course, significant under our tax laws for purposes of determining
whether on the sale or exchange of such property, the proceeds shall
be treated as capital gains or losses or as ordinary income or losses.
In connection with the holding period for stock dividends, the regula-
145. SEN. REP. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 5.
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tions have consistently provided that the stock dividend was regarded
as having been held for the same period as the old stock. 4 However,
these provisions were based on the premise that stock dividends could
not be taxed and that some part of the cost of the old stock should be
apportioned between the old and the new stocks. This premise was part
of the administrative scheme which was declared to be without statutory
authority in the Koshland case. Accordingly, following that case, a related
problem to the determination of the proper basis applicable to the stock
dividend was that of determining the period for which such dividend
had been held. In the Gowran case, it was held that the stock dividends
had been held only from the date of distribution and that the holding
period of the original stock was not applicable thereto.'
The Court referred to Article 501 of Regulations 704 which provided
that if the old stock had been held for more than two years, then both
the old and the new stocks were to be considered capital assets. The
Court went on to conclude that since this was based on the administrative
provisions for apportioning the cost of the old stock between the old
and new stocks, which was declared to be without statutory authority
in the Koshland case, Article 501 of Regulations 74 was similarly with-
out statutory authority.
48
The provisions of Section 214(c) and (f) of the 1939 Act modify
this holding. If the rule of allocation was used in determining the basis
of the new stock, then the holding period of the old stock is applicable
in determining the period for which the taxpayer held the new stock.14'
However, if, in a taxable year beginning before January 1, 1936, the
new stock was included in gross income or the new or the old stock
was disposed of and the basis for determining gain or loss ascertained
by a method other than the allocation rule, then the holding period of
the old stock is not pertinent in determining the period for which the
new stock is held.
The provisions of Section 214(c) and (f) also settled the question
as to the proper holding period applicable to stock rights and to stock
acquired by the exercise of such rights. The holding period applicable
to such stock or rights was, under prior law, in considerable confusion.
In Miles v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company,150 the Supreme Court was
dealing with rights to purchase the same kind or class of stock as that
with respect to which the rights had been issued. The Court did not
pass directly on the holding period applicable to such rights but held that
146. U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, 65 and 69, Art. 1651; U. S. Treas. Reg. 74 and 77, Art.
501; U. S. Treas. Reg. 86 and 94, Art. 117-3; and U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 117-4.
147. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238, 244 (1937).
148. Id. at 244, n. 2.
149. See T. D. 4938, § 20B.5, see note 82 supra.
150. 259 U. S. 247 (1922).
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part of the old stock's basis should be apportioned to the rights since
such rights must be regarded "as an increase inseparable from the old
shares, not in the way of income, but as capital;" the new shares "if
and when issued [must be treated] as indistinguishable legally and in
the market sense from the old ;" and "the sale of the rights [should be
regarded] as a sale of a portion of a capital interest that included the
old shares."' 5
On the basis of this case, the Bureau had held consistently that where
stock rights were sold (rather than exercised) there should be included
in determining the period for which such rights were held the period
for which the taxpayer held the stock with respect to which the rights
were issued."5 2 The Board of Tax Appeals had also regarded the holding
period of the old stock as applicable to the stock rights issued on that
stock in determining gain or loss on the sale of such rights.1" And this
rule was regarded as applicable to stock rights whether on the sale of
such rights, the taxpayer apportioned part of the old stock's basis to
the rights,154 or whether he reported as income the entire proceeds from
the sale of the rights pursuant to the option contained in the regula-
tions.' 5
The situation was hardly so clear cut in connection with the deter-
mination of the holding period applicable to the stock acquired by the
exercise of stock rights. The Bureau first held that where such stock
rights were exercised, the stock so acquired was to have the same holding
period as the stock with respect to which the rights had been issued.'1
The Board of Tax Appeals, however, disagreed in this respect and
concluded that the holding period of the new stock began with the date
of its acquisition (and not the date the old stock was acquired or even
the date the stock rights were issued).' ' Following the Board's decision,
the Bureau reversed its prior position and held that the holding period
of the new stock began to run from the date of its acquisition.1 8 On
further consideration of this question, the Bureau modified its position
and adopted a middle ground. It held that in computing the holding
151. Id. at 253.
152. G. C. M. 11645, XII-2 Cu-m. BULL. 117 (1933); G. C. M. 12942, XIII-1 Cum.
BULL. 73 (1934).
153. Bradley W. Palmer, 32 B.T.A. 550 (1935), acquiesced in by Comm'r ou this
issue, XIV-2 Cum. BULL. 17 (1935); Samuel Insull, Jr., 32 B.T.A. 1070 (1935), op.
substituted for 32 B.T.A. 567 (1935) und nodifying, 32 B.T.A. 47 (1939).
154. Lee v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935).
155. See note 153 supra.
156. I. T. 1786, H1-2 Cumr. BULL. 45 (1923).
157. Rodman E. Griscom, 22 B.T.A. 979 (1931); Ellen Ayer Wood, 29 B.T.A. 1050
(1934); May Rogers, 32 B.T.A. 1176 (1935).
158. G. C. M. 10063, X-2 Cum. BULL. 159 (1931); and I. T. 2609, X-2 CuM. BUL.
339 (1931), revoking I. T. 1786, note 156 supra.
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period of the stock acquired by the exercise of rights, part of the new
stock (which represented the rights) should be regarded as having been
held as long as the old share was held, and part of the new stuck (which
represented a new capital contribution to the corporation) should be
regarded as having been held from the date such new stock was
acquired." 9 The Bureau, however, was still unsatisfied with its deter-
mination of this question and upon reconsideration reverted to the posi-
tion that the new stock's holding period began with the date of its
acquisition rather than with that of the old stock.lC
Then some of the Board decisions on this point were appealed. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that part of the new
stock acquired on the exercise of rights had been held for the holding
period attributable to the new stock and part of the new stock had been
held from the date the new capital was contributed.01 Thereafter, the
Secohid Circuit 1 2 and the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion. 3
Following this, the Board in turn reconsidered its position, decided to
reverse itself and followed the position of the First, Second and Seventh
Circuits in this respect.'6 The Bureau, however, continued to regard
the holding period of the new stock as beginning with the date of its
acquisition.
Section 214(c) and (f) put a stop to the legal merry-go-round on
this point. That section requires the tacking of the old stock's holding
period to the stock rights where the basis of such rights is determined
by the allocation principle. In the case of stock acquired by the exercise
of such rights, those sections would also seem to require a tacking of
the old stock's holding period to the new stock, to the extent that the
allocation principle is applicable in determining the basis of such new
stock. 165
However, it should be noted that the provisions do not achieve com-
plete equity insofar as concerns those taxpayers who disposed of stock
rights and under the then available option included the entire proceeds
from the sale of such rights in gross income. Under prior law, it was
recognized that the holding period of the old stock was applicable to
rights, whether the entire proceeds of the sale were included in income
159. G. C. Al. 11645, XII-1 Cum. BuLL 117, modifying G. C.AM. 10063, mipra note 158.
160. G. C. Al. 12942, XIII-1 Cum. BuLL. 73, revoking G. C.. . 11645, sspra note 159.
on this issue and reinstating G. C. M. 10063, supra note 158.
161. Wood v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935).
162. Macy v. Helvering, 82 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
163. Insull v. Comm'r, 87 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
164. Walter Fitch, Jr., 35 B.T.A. 537 (1937).
165. However, T. D. 4938, § 20B.5, supra note 82, is silent on this particular point
relating to the holding period of stock acquired by the exercise of rights. It specifically
provides for "tacking" only in the case of the rights.
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or part of the old stock's basis was allocated to the rights.Y" Now,
however, while the statute recognizes the inclusion of the entire proceeds
on the sale of rights as proper for rights sold in a taxable year begin-
ning before January 1, 1939,167 the holding period of the old stock would
not seem applicable to such rights since the basis was not determined by
the allocation principle. And the taxpayer may not under the statute
change his method of reporting such proceeds at this stage. 8 Accord-
ingly, the holding period for such rights begins, under the present pro-
visions, with the date they were issued to the taxpayer. The Commissioner
may thus treat such proceeds, in years still "open," not as capital gain
but as ordinary income.
Such taxpayers exercised an election when the benefit of the holding
period was recognized as part of that election. Now, they are bound to
their election while the attendant benefits are withdrawn. Obviously, this
is a highly inequitable result. The failure of Congress to make adequate
provision in this regard either may have been prompted by the difficulties
in drafting an exception relating to this case, or may have been a casits
ornissus.
CONCLUSION
On the whole, Section 214 of the Revenue Act of 1939 represents a
sound effort to bring some order out of a highly chaotic situation in
the tax laws. It does this in a way designed to assure a large measure
of fairness both to taxpayers and to the Treasury. Its minor omissions
may well be attributed to the limitations of time in which the statute
was carried through both houses of Congress."0 ' Finally, the "hard
cases" not covered by the section might well be the subject of future
consideration by the Congress.
166. See note 153 supra.
167. INT. Rzv. CODE § 113(a) (19) (B) and RmuE AcT OF 1939, § 214(e) (2).
168. The last clause of § 113(a) (19) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that ". . . and no part of the proceeds of the sale of such new stock [rights] shall ever
be excluded from the gross income of the year of such sale." § 214(e) (2) is similar.
169. This bill was introduced in the House on June 15, 1939 and became law on
June 29, 1939.
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